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Executive Summary
This dissertation consists of three essays dealing with the concept of career
concerns. Exhibiting the desire to be perceived favorably by others is at the
core of this concept. For over three decades researchers have been investi-
gating this concept in theory and in practice. This thesis contributes to the
theoretical strand of literature with three models. While each essay high-
lights a di↵erent organizational issue, the common ground of all three is the
relationship between a principal (she) and a career concerned agent (he).
Essay 1 studies the e↵ect of career concerns with respect to one of the fun-
damental organizational questions arising naturally in business: how should
a job consisting of two sequential tasks be allocated among the employees?
Should the same agent be in charge (integration), or should di↵erent agents
be in charge (separation)? We find a well-known rent-saving e↵ect favoring
integration and a novel shirking e↵ect favoring separation. This shirking ef-
fect is purely due to the career concerns of the agent. A project, which is
always successful might undermine the contribution of the agent in charge.
The agent then has an incentive to shirk in one stage of the project, just to
show that the project’s success is due to the agent’s contribution. In case of
separation, the agent has one task only to signal his ability, and hence is well
incentivized.
Essay 2 considers an agent who serves as an expert. He investigates the
circumstances for an investment. Depending on the underlying state of the
ii
world, a risky or a safe project should be executed. His career concerns,
contrary to the ones in Essay 1, target at the correctness of his evaluation.
We examine the role of information an outside party has access to as an in-
centive instrument for a career concerned expert. Two distinguished degrees
of information are considered, intransparency and transparency. The latter
allows the market to have access to additional relevant information with re-
spect to the agent’s evaluation. Making an organization transparent comes
at a cost, but nevertheless we find instances where transparency is optimal
due to the expert’s career concerns. His incentives are increased once the
market has superior inference capability, i.e. once the organization is made
transparent.
Finally, Essay 3 examines the interplay between explicit and implicit incen-
tives of a career concerned agent. Akin to Essay 2 the agent is modeled as an
expert who investigates the nature of a project whose outcome depends on
the underlying state of the world. While the modeling of the career concerns
is similar to Essay 2, the focus is di↵erent. This time the principal has two in-
struments at hand to incentivize the career concerned agent, namely o↵ering
a bonus contingent on a well performed project and secondly, a double-check
after a rejected project. The latter generates the information about the cor-
rectness of the agent’s decision. We find that the principal prefers to o↵er
a bonus if the prior probability of implementing correctly is su ciently low.
The use of double-checks is preferred, otherwise.
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Essay 1: Separation vs. Integration subject to
Career Concerned Agents
Kevin Remmy *
Abstract
We employ a two-staged hidden action model with risk-neutral agents who exhibit
not only limited liability but also career concerns. A risk neutral principal then
hires either one (integration) or two agents (separation) to work on this two-staged
project. The project itself can be easy or di cult. While an easy project always
succeeds, exerting e↵ort by an agent can increase the success probabilities of a dif-
ficult project. Investigating the optimal organizational form, we find integration
to benefit from a well-known rent-saving e↵ect, but to su↵er from a novel shirking
incentive in the second stage. After a successful first stage, an agent working in
both stages might welcome a second stage failure in order to produce a perfect
signal of the project being di cult. In case of separation, this e↵ect is not present,
as two di↵erent agents are working in each stage.
*Institute for Organization and Human Resource Management, University of Bern,
Engehaldenstr. 4, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland, e-mail: kevin.remmy@iop.unibe.ch. I am
grateful to Frauke von Bieberstein for stimulating discussions. I also thank the participants
of the workshop in Oppenau (2015), especially Peter-J. Jost for helpful comments. All
errors are mine.
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1.1 Introduction
According to a recent PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) survey one key indica-
tor of business success is innovation. The survey asked 1200 CEOs around the
world. The process of innovation roughly consists of two sequential phases,
the R&D phase and the commercialization phase.1 One important determi-
nant of innovation realization is the organization of these two phases. Should
be one economic party be in charge of both phases (integration) or should
control over both phases be divided up between two parties (separation)?
Particularly, we examine the e↵ect of career concerned parties, where each
party’s decision is also influenced by the desire to be perceived favorably
by the market. Our model uses principal-agent theory to shed light on this
organizational question. A principal hires either one agent performing both
stages or two agents working on one stage each. From the perspective of an
integrated organization, our findings are a well-known rent-saving e↵ect2 and
a novel shirking e↵ect which is purely due to the reputational considerations
of the agent. To fix ideas, consider a principal hiring either one (integration)
or two (separation) agents to work on a two-staged project which can either
be easy or di cult. If the project is of easy type, then it is assumed to
always succeed in each stage. If the project is di cult, however, then the
success probability of each stage depends on the agent’s type who is either
smart or dumb. Additionally, the success probabilities depend on the agent’s
e↵ort which is also modeled binary, thus either the agent exerts e↵ort or
not. E↵ort is costly and unobservable. Assuming only a smart agent’s ef-
fort improves the success probabilities, a successful first stage signals either
the project is easy or the agent is smart. Under integration then, the agent
has the incentive to shirk in the second stage after a first-stage success, as a
failure in the second stage allows the market to infer that the project is of
1Compare figure 1.1. in Greenhalgh et al. (2010).
2Compare Laux (2001).
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di cult type and as a consequence the first-stage success is likely made by a
smart agent. This incentive is the more present the higher the agent values
his career concerns. On the other hand a failure in the second stage results
in a lower payment, since the principal is interested in a success and hence,
agrees on higher payments for success than for failures.
Most closely related to our model is Schmitz (2005), where smart agents
are working on di cult projects only. As a consequence, his findings are
also present in our model. Schmitz (2005) argues that the principal saves
the payment to incentivizes the agent in the first stage under integration as
the agent exerts e↵ort anyway in order not to miss the second stage rent.
This rent-saving e↵ect of an integrated organization is openly present in our
model. Schmitz (2005) finds the downside of integration to be the agent’s
incentive to shirk in the first stage due to the assumption that the success
probabilities in the second stage depend on the first-stage outcome. As a
result, the benefit of e↵ort is lowered in the second stage after a first-stage
failure and thus the principals o↵ered payment needs to compensate for this
circumstance. In anticipation of this, the agent has an incentive to shirk in
the first stage. While the entire logic of the drawback is also present in our
model, our focus however, is totally distinct namely on the incentive to shirk
in second stage which is not present in Schmitz (2005)’s model. Schmitz
(2005)’s finding is based on the assumption that the first stage incentive
constraint is stronger once the principal prefers to incentivize the agent in
the second stage even after a first stage failure. Our model instead assumes
the second stage constraint to be binding such that shirking in the first stage
is present but not decisive.
Looking at a broader perspective, two strands of literature are brought to-
gether, the task assignment literature on the one hand and the career concern
literature on the other hand. Initiated by Milgrom and Holmstro¨m (1991)’s
seminal paper, the focus of the task assignment literature has long been on
3
multitasking problems arising within a principal - agent setting as trade-o↵s
between insurance and incentives of risk averse agents. Our model however
focuses on risk neutral agents bounded by wealth constraints.3 Moreover,
critical to our model is the assumption of tasks being performed sequen-
tially.4 Laux (2001) analyzes a principal-agent model with multiple projects.
He finds a rent-saving e↵ect for a risk neutral principal hiring a risk neutral
agent who exhibits limited liability. The agent is willing to exert e↵ort on
an additional project in order not to risk the rent of the first project. Con-
sequently, Laux (2001) argues that it is optimal for the principal to o↵er
incentive schemes contingent on multiple projects. Besides Schmitz (2005),
several articles have highlighted di↵erent aspects corresponding to these as-
sumptions. For instance, Schmitz (2012) considers an outcome externality
between tasks. A conflict of tasks results in a reduced success probability of
the second stage after a first - stage success. Similarly, a synergy of tasks
is given by an increased success probability of the second stage after a first
- stage success. Schmitz (2012) finds integration to be superior if tasks are
in conflict due to the fact that a hired agent has an additional incentive to
exert e↵ort in the first stage, since a first stage success ensures a high bonus
for a second stage success due to a reduced e↵ectiveness of e↵ort. Our model
considers the case of synergy of tasks because we assumed a first stage suc-
cess indeed increases the expected success probability of the second stage.
Contrary to Schmitz (2012), the principal does not earn any rent in the first
stage, but only after a second stage success. As a result, integration might
be superior due to a rent-saving e↵ect.
Khalil et al. (2006) investigate a hybrid model considering both moral hazard
and adverse selection issues. While exerting unobservable e↵ort to improve
3Compare Innes (1990) who was the first to analyze the assumption of limited liability
within a moral hazard context.
4Compare Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Chapter 6.2 for simultaneous models with
risk neutral agents and hidden actions.
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success probabilities in first stage captures the moral hazard component, the
outcome of the first stage remains unknown to the principal, but is known
by the performing agent. This leads to an adverse selection problem for
the second stage. Che and Hoo (2001) on the other hand focus purely on
moral hazard problems, like we do. Their focus, however, is on investigating
the optimality of hiring a team of two identical agents to perform in each
stage instead of one. Jost and Lammers (2010) introduce an initial screen-
ing phase before the implementation phase of the project. Akin to Sah and
Stiglitz (1986), evaluating the project is either organized as a hierarchy or
as a polyarchy. Moreover, the principal decides whether an agent involved
in the screening should be in charge of the subsequent implementation (in-
tegration) or a new agent (separation). Jost and Lammers (2010) find the
principal to favor integration due to a rent-saving e↵ect since then the agent
in charge of implementation accepts a lower wage for the screening phase
and nevertheless is su ciently incentivized due to the prospect of gains for
implementation. This rent-saving argument is strongest for the first agent
in line of the evaluation as he screens all the projects. Additionally, Jost
and Lammers (2010) find hierarchy to be superior to polyarchy since under
the latter organizational form more projects reach the implementation phase
which requires the principal to pay for more instances.
The second strand of literature originates in Holmstro¨m (1982/99) who for-
malized Fama (1980)’s idea of market - driven incentives, which is described
as the prospect of future earnings bearing a disciplinary e↵ect on agent’s
performance at present. Ever since, the benefit and downside of career con-
cerns have been investigated. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) for instance find
a combination of explicit and implicit incentives both theoretically to be
optimal and empirically to be evident. Relatively speaking, implicit incen-
tives should be strongest at a start of a career as then reaping the benefit
of increased reputations is longest. Vice versa, the closer to retirement, the
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larger should be the explicit incentives. Suurmond et al. (2004) find within
an adverse selection model that reputational concerns might be beneficial
to welfare, because the intention for distinction enhances the incentives of
high-typed agents. On the downside of career concerns are a tendency to
herd, i.e. to ignore private information which conflicts with observed infor-
mation. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) employ a two staged project choice
model to show the incentive of the second agent to go along with the project
choice of the first agent despite contrary valuable information. Career con-
cerns prevent ine cient use of information as conflicting decisions put the
agent at risk to bear the reputational cost of a failure alone. If two agents
sequentially decide about a public project and the quality of information is
endogenously determined, Swank and Visser (2008) find a tendency of the
first agent to free ride on the second agent. Another source of ine cient use
of information is analyzed in Prendergast and Stole (1996) who find a young
professional to overvalue new information in order to show confidence and
an experienced professional to undervalue new information in order not to
destroy the market’s inference from previous decision.
Our model captures both positive and negative e↵ects of career concerns. On
the positive side, the principal saves on payments as reputational concerns
serve as substitutes for explicit incentives. On the negative side, career con-
cerns put pressure on working in the second stage after a first stage success
if the agent is in charge of both stages. This is because the first stage success
is a strong signal for the agent’s type being smart. But only a failure in one
of the two stages, let the market infer that the project is characterized as
di cult. This drawback of reputational concerns under integration is new.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces
the basic model including the timing of the game. Section 1.3 analyzes
both organizational forms, separation and integration. Section 1.4 presents
a discussion and section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 The Basic Model
Consider a two - staged decision model about a project with a R&D phase in
stage one and a commercialization phase in stage two. Each stage might re-
sult in a success or in a failure. The outcome of stage i 2 {1, 2} is Ei 2 {0, 1}
where 0 represents a failure and 1 represents a success. A successful R&D
phase increases the success probability for the second stage. However, a fail-
ure in stage i = 1 can still result in a success in stage i = 2. The principal
ultimately is interested in a success in stage two. The principal can hire an
agent to exert costly but unobservable e↵ort to increase the success prob-
abilities in each stage. The benefit of e↵ort depends on the agent’s type
who is equally likely either dumb (du) or smart (sm). No party involved
knows about the type’s realization, neither the agent himself nor the market.
In addition to the e↵ort and type dependence of the success probabilities,
the project is also binary characterized. With the prior probability of p the
project is easy and then assumed to be always successful in both stages even
without any agent’s e↵ort exerted. For the remainder 1  p of the projects,
they are difficult and then the probabilities heavily hinge on agent’s type
and e↵ort. For di cult projects it is assumed that a dumb agent can never
successfully perform the R&D phase, while a smart agent does so with prob-
ability 1 . This notation stands for an indicator function which relates to
exerted e↵ort. Thus, the indicator function is one if the smart agent exerts
e↵ort, saying the first stage results in a success for sure. If the agent does not
exert e↵ort, then the indicator function is zero and the success probability for
the first stage is zero even though the agent is smart. Once the first phase is
completed, the outcome is made public. The first-stage probability for suc-
cess incorporates the stated assumptions, Pr (E1 = 1) = p+
1
2 (1  p) 1 . Let
Pr (Ee1 = 1) notate the term with 1  = 1 and Pr (E
ne
1 = 1) with 1  = 0. If the
agent does exert e↵ort then Pr (Ee1 = 1) = p+
1
2 (1  p) and Pr (Ene1 = 1) = p,
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otherwise. If no e↵ort is exerted, the only way a project is still successful is
when the project is easy. In addition to all easy projects the success proba-
bility is increased by the chance that a smart agent exerts e↵ort on a di cult
project and thus always succeeds. Remember that a dumb agent who ex-
erts e↵ort on a di cult project does always produce a failure. The following
matrices summarize the first stage probability for success depending on both
e↵ort and type.
Stage 1
Type
sm du
E↵ort
yes 1 p
no p p
Conditionally on a success in the first stage, the probability of a second stage
success for a di cult project is assumed to be d + 1µ1µ1 if the performing
agent is smart. For a first-stage failure the probability drops to d + 1µ0µ0,
presuming µ1 > µ0. Again, indicator functions are involved representing
the e↵ect of e↵ort. For a dumb agent on the other hand the second stage
success probabilities are assumed to be d for di cult projects irrespective of
the outcome of the first stage and the level of e↵ort in the second stage. The
following matrix summarizes the success probabilities for the second stage
conditionally on a success in the first stage.
Stage 2 after E1 = 1
Type
sm du
E↵ort
yes p+ (1  p) (d+ µ1) p+ (1  p) d
no p+ (1  p) d p+ (1  p) d
Recall that easy projects are always successful in both stages and hence a
failure in the first stage concludes the project to be di cult. The success
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probabilities for the second stage conditionally on a failure, i.e. E1 = 0,
change accordingly.
Stage 2 after E1 = 0
Type
sm du
E↵ort
yes d+ µ0 d
no d d
The probability that the project is easy after a first stage success is in-
ferred using Bayes’ theorem: Pr (easy|E1 = 1) = Pr(E1=1|easy)Pr(E1=1) Pr (easy) =
p
p+ 121 (1 p)
. Analogously, a first stage success alters the probability of a dif-
ficult project to Pr (difficult|E1 = 1) =
1
21 (1 p)
p+ 121 (1 p)
. While the first stage
success probability was treated irrespective of the organizational form, since
separation and integration are identical if looked only at the first stage, this
is no longer the case once the second stage enters the picture. The reason
is that the market which initially holds the same information with respect
to the agent’s type, namely the prior, can updated its beliefs after stage one
if the same agent is in charge of both stages. These posterior beliefs held
by the market depend on the e↵ort exerted. In equilibrium, the market’s
anticipation of the chosen e↵ort levels and the agents choices about their ef-
fort must match. In case of separation, the outcome of the first stage has no
influence on the assessment of the agent’s type performing the second stage,
as both agent’s types are independently drawn. Consequently, the market’s
posterior belief remains unchanged and equals the prior probability. Things
are quite di↵erent for integration, because the same agent is performing both
stages. Consider the market beliefs that the agent is exerting e↵ort in the
first stage, then a first stage failure is only produced by a dumb agent. A
success however, does not signal perfectly that the performing agent is smart
as the project could be easy and then succeed always. In order to di↵erenti-
9
ate between the two organizational forms, let us denote Pri (·) with i = I, S
for integration (I) and separation (S). The following conditional success
probabilities capture all assumptions:
Pr
S
(E2 = 1|E1 = 1) = p
p+ 121  (1  p)
+
1
21  (1  p)
 
1
2 (d+ 1µ1µ1) +
1
2d
 
p+ 121  (1  p)
(1.1)
and
Pr
I
(E2 = 1|E1 = 1) = p
p+ 121  (1  p)
+
1
21  (1  p)
p+ 121  (1  p)
(d+ 1µ1µ1) . (1.2)
The di↵erence between both expressions is kept in the last bracket considering
the probability that the second stage is successful conditional on a di cult
project and a first stage success. Under integration the market perfectly
infers that the agent must be smart while under separation a new agent is in
charge of the second stage.
Each agent endows no wealth and exhibits career concerns reflected in the
posterior belief the market has with respect to his type. This posterior belief
is weighted by a non-negative, commonly known scalar  . Moreover, the
principal pays the agent a wage contingent on the outcomes of both stages
and the agent bears the cost of e↵ort. All components are added up. The
principal hires either one agent for each stage (separation) or hires one agent
performing both stages (integration). In case of a second-stage success she
receives V > 0. For each situation the principal o↵ers optimal contracts
taking into account the agent’s limited liability. The optimal organizational
form is at the focus of our paper and analyzed in the next section.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
0.A 0.B 1 2 3
-
nature principal agent agent payments
chooses decides on chooses chooses are made
agent’s and organizational e↵ort for e↵ort for and posteriors
project’s type form stage 1 stage 2 are updated
In stage 0.A, nature draws the agent’s and the project’s type. Both realiza-
tions remain unknown to all parties. The principal then decides upon the
organizational form and o↵ers a contract to either one or two agents, respec-
tively, in stage 0.B. Note that we assume that she is not able to make her
choice dependent on the outcome of the first agent’s work. Upon accept-
ing the contract, the performing agent decides upon exerting e↵ort in each
stage. The outcome of stage 1 of the project is made public after stage 1 of
the timeline. The second stage e↵ort decision is contingent on the first stage
outcome. Finally, the outcomes realizes in stage 3, the agent or both agents
are paid as contractually arranged and the market updates all information
via Bayesian Updating.
1.3 Main Results
Before the optimal contracts are derived and compared, the success proba-
bilities under integration and separation are looked at more closely. Ex ante,
the pair of events that both stages succeed is under integration
Pr
I
(E2 = 1, E1 = 1) = p+
1
2
(1  p) 1  (d+ 1µ1µ1) (1.3)
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and under separation
Pr
S
(E2 = 1, E1 = 1) = p+
1
2
(1  p) 1 
✓
d+
1
2
1µ1µ1
◆
. (1.4)
For both it holds that all easy projects are fully captured and moreover,
both expressions equalize if e↵ort is not exerted in both stages. The benefit
of integration realizes after a first stage success while a first stage failure
benefits separation. Upon e↵ort exerted, only a dumb agent produces a
failure in the first stage. In case of integration the dumb agent then also
performs the second stage while for separation the second agent could still
be smart. This is also seen in the ex ante probabilities of the pair of events
that the first stage fails but nevertheless the second stage succeeds, i.e.:
Pr
I
(E2 = 1, E1 = 0) = (1  p)
✓
1
2
(1  1 ) (d+ 1µ0µ0) +
1
2
d
◆
(1.5)
and
Pr
S
(E2 = 1, E1 = 0) = (1  p)
✓
1  1
2
1 
◆✓
d+
1
2
1µ0µ0
◆
. (1.6)
Considering 1  = 1, the benefit of separation is revealed, i.e. PrI(E2 =
1, Ee1 = 0) =
1
2 (1  p) d and PrS(E2 = 1, Ee1 = 0) = 12 (1  p)
 
d+ 121µ0µ0
 
.
The success probability is larger under separation as the second agent could
be smart while under integration the agent is knowingly dumb. If no e↵ort
is exerted in the first stage, then both expressions equal.
As the principal is primarily interested in the second stage success, it is
important to notice which benefit dominates. The answer to this question is
found in the assumption that a successful R&D phase increases the second
stage success probabilities. Put di↵erently, PrI(E2 = 1)   PrS(E2 = 1) =
1
4 (1  p) 1  (1µ1µ1   1µ0µ0)5 is non-negative due to the assumption µ1 > µ0.
5The following expressions are used: PrI(E2 = 1) = PrI(E2 = 1, E1 = 1) + PrI(E2 =
1, E1 = 0) and PrS(E2 = 1) = PrS(E2 = 1, E1 = 1) + PrS(E2 = 1, E1 = 0).
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This is the well-known rent-saving e↵ect described in the introduction.6
The principal o↵ers one or two agents a contract which specifies the payment
contingent on the outcomes of both stages. As each agent is bearing the
cost of e↵ort entirely and the exerted e↵ort is uncontractible, the principal
faces a classical moral hazard problem. The principal copes with this by
o↵ering contracts which fulfill the participation and incentive constraint for
each agent. The incentive constraint for one of the two stages ensures the
agent to exert e↵ort in this stage. If the principal does not seek the agent to
exert some e↵ort in one stage, then the corresponding incentive constraint
does not need to be met by the optimal contract. The following three e↵ort
profiles are analyzed.7 Let S1 denote the e↵ort profile under separation when
the principal wants the agent in the first stage and the agent in the second
stage to exert e↵ort irrespective of the first stage outcome. S0 denotes the
profile under separation, when the agent in the first stage exerts e↵ort and
in the second stage only after a success in first stage. Once the principal
chooses integration, then only one e↵ort profile is considered. Denote I the
profile which incentivizes the agent in the first and in the second stage after
a first stage success. Incentivizing the agent in the second stage after a
failure is not optimal, as a failure in the first stage with exerted e↵ort is only
feasibly made by a dumb agent. As e↵ort by dumb agents does not increase
the success probabilities but just produces costs, the second stage incentive
constraint under integration and after a first stage failure is not binding. For
each organizational form and e↵ort profile the optimal contract is derived.
6Compare Laux (2001) and Schmitz (2005).
7We assume that all other potential e↵ort profiles are unprofitable for the principal.
In particular, the principal always wants the agent in the first stage to exert e↵ort.
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Separation
The principal hires agent A to work in the first stage and agent B in the
second. She o↵ers both agents a separate contract. The incentive constraint
of agent A requires that exerting e↵ort grants a higher expected utility than
shirking, i.e.:
Pr(Ee1 = 1)u
A
1 +Pr(E
e
1 = 0)u
A
0   c   Pr(Ene1 = 1)uA1 +Pr(Ene1 = 0)uA0 (1.7)
using uAi = w
A
i + ⇤E[smA|Ee1 = i] with i = 0, 1 as Bernoulli utility functions8
once the outcome of the first stage was a success or failure respectively.
The benefit of e↵ort must o↵set the cost of e↵ort c, as shirking would be
optimal otherwise. The principal takes the agent’s A incentive constraint
into account when setting the contingent payments wAi . Since it is never
optimal to incentivize a failure in the first stage, the principal optimally
sets wA0 = 0. Inserting the utilities, recognizing the maximizing behavior by
the principal and making use of the relation Pr(Ee1 = 1)   Pr(Ene1 = 1) =
  (Pr(Ee1 = 0)  Pr(Ene1 = 0)) reduces the constraint to
wA1  
c
Pr(Ee1 = 1)  Pr(Ene1 = 1)
    (E[smA|Ee1 = 1]  E[smA|Ee1 = 0])
(1.8)
The higher the cost of e↵ort c, the higher the contingent payment wA1 in order
to fulfill the incentive constraint. The higher the benefit of e↵ort, i.e. the
di↵erence Pr(Ee1 = 1)   Pr(Ene1 = 1), the lower is wA1 . The e↵ect of career
concerns depend on the sign of E[smA|Ee1 = 1]   E[smA|Ee1 = 0], as the
weight   is assumed to be non-negative. The di↵erence is non-negative since
a success in the first stage is more likely made by a smart agent and vice versa,
a failure is more likely made by a dumb agent. In total, the career concerns
by the agent A allow the principal to o↵er a lower contingent payment wA1 .
8Compare Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 184) for a definition.
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Thus, the principal internalizes the agent’s desire to be perceived favorably
by the market by o↵ering reduced contingent payments. Due to limited
liability however, it must hold wA1   0 even if the agent exhibits extreme
strong career concerns such that the incentive constraint would have been
met with a negative wA1 .
Agent B is o↵ered a contract before the first stage starts and hence has
two incentive constraints for each outcome of the first stage. Yet again,
exerting e↵ort must grant a higher utility than shirking conditionally on
either outcome in the first stage. Agent B always expects that agent A
has exerted e↵ort. Consider a success in the first stage, then the constraint
requires:
Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)uB11 + Pr
S
(Ee2 = 0|Ee1 = 1)uB10   c   (1.9)
Pr
S
(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)uB11 + Pr
S
(Ene2 = 0|Ee1 = 1)uB10
Since the organizational form matters with respect to the success probabili-
ties in the second stage, all probabilities run the index S. Applying the same
logic as above, the constraint reduces to:
wB11  
c
PrS(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)  PrS(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)
(1.10)
   (Pr(smB|Ee2 = 1, E1 = 1)  Pr(smB|Ee2 = 0, E1 = 1))
Similarly, in case of a first-stage failure the constraint is given by:
Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 0)uB01 + Pr
S
(Ee2 = 0|Ee1 = 0)uB00   c   (1.11)
Pr
S
(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 0)uB01 + Pr
S
(Ene2 = 0|Ee1 = 0)uB00
which results in:
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wB01  
c
PrS(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 0)  PrS(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 0)
(1.12)
   (Pr(smB|E2 = 1, E1 = 0)  Pr(smB|E2 = 0 , E1 = 0))
Each constraint ensures the optimality of exerting costly e↵ort by the agent.
It holds for separation that each constraint is easier fulfilled for an increased
career concern parameter  . While we assume that the principal always
desires the agent in the first stage to exert e↵ort, she has the choice concerning
the second stage. For example, she might prefer to leave a second stage e↵ort
aside after a first stage failure. In this case, the third incentive constraint
dealing with exactly this situation is not binding. If she desires the agent B
to be incentivized irrespective of the first stage outcome, then she must ensure
to meet all three constraints by setting the contingent payments accordingly.
Comparing the principal’s utility under separation between incentivizing the
agent B only after a success
 
UPS0
 
and irrespective of the first stage outcome 
UPS1
 
reveals the benefit of both e↵ort profiles:
UPS1 =
⇣
Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1) + Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)
⌘
V   Pr(Ee1 = 1)wA1
(1.13)
 Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1)w
B
11   Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)w
B
01
and
UPS0 =
⇣
Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1) + Pr
S
(Ene2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)
⌘
V   Pr(Ee1 = 1)wA1
(1.14)
 Pr
S
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1)w
B
11.
The contingent payments are set equal to their corresponding constraint and
are the same in both utility functions. Consequently, the benefit of incen-
tivizing agent B even after a first-stage failure is a higher success probability
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of the second stage, i.e. PrS(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)   PrS(Ene2 = 1, Ee1 = 0)   0.
The benefit of incentivizing agent B only after a first stage success however
is the cost saving of PrS(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)w
B
01.
Integration
Instead of hiring two agents, the principal o↵ers only agent C to work in both
stages. Incentivizing the agent in both stages after a first stage failure can
not be optimal due to the assumption made. If the agent has exerted e↵ort
and still produces a failure in the first stage, the principal perfectly infers the
agent’s type, namely dumb. Therefore, exerting e↵ort in the second stage is
of no use because only smart agent’s e↵ort benefits the success probabilities.
Moreover, the principal is only interested in a second stage success and hence
has no intention to award any other outcome than two consecutive successes
wC11. Thus, she sets w
C
10 = w
C
01 = w
C
00 = 0. The following inequality captures
the second stage incentive constraint9 of agent C:
Pr
I
(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)uC11 + Pr
I
(Ee2 = 0|Ee1 = 1)uC10   c   (1.15)
Pr
I
(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)uC11 + Pr
I
(Ene2 = 0|Ee1 = 1)uC10
Analogously to wB11, the inequality is equivalent to:
wC11  
c
PrI(Ee2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)  PrI(Ene2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)
(1.16)
   (Pr(smC |Ee2 = 1, Ee1 = 1)  Pr(smC |Ee2 = 0, Ee1 = 1))
This constraint shows the negative consequence of career concerns. Since the
market perfectly infers the agent to be smart if the first stage was a success
and the second failed, i.e. Pr(smC |Ee2 = 0, Ee1 = 1) = 1 and so the term in
9Due to our focus we assume a minimum share of easy projects, i.e. p   µ1 2d2d+3µ1 , in
order to ensure that the second-stage incentive constraint is stricter than the first-stage
constraint. This issue is further discussed in section 1.4.
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brackets is negative. The larger the career concern parameter  , the higher
the required contingent payment to ensure the agent to be incentivized in
the second stage after a first stage failure.
Installing the organizational form of integration and o↵ering agent C the
minimum contingent payment such that he is incentivized to exert e↵ort in
the first stage and in the second stage after a first stage success, the utility
of the principal amounts to:
UPI =
⇣
Pr
I
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1) + Pr
I
(Ene2 = 1, E
e
1 = 0)
⌘
V (1.17)
 Pr
I
(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1)w
C
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Comparing Separation and Integration
Which organizational form is installed is for the principal to decide. Three
di↵erent constellations of organizational form and e↵ort profile are to be
considered, namely S1, S0 and I with the latter being the principal’s choice
to hire agent C for both stages and incentivizing the first stage and the second
stage after a first stage success only. All three utilities of the principal are
compared at once using indi↵erence curves as auxiliary functions in (V,  )
space.10 Three auxiliary functions are constructed, let us denote US1S0 the
curve indicating all non-negative combinations of (V,  ) where the principal is
indi↵erent between choosing the organizational form of separation and either
S1 or S0. Analogously, denote UIS1 and UIS0 being the collection of (V,  )
combinations where the principal is indi↵erent between choosing integration I
and S1 or S0, respectively. Based on these functions, the following proposition
states the results.
10Due to the complexity of the problem, no analytical solution was found.
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Proposition 1 In absence of any career concerns, i.e.   = 0, then the
following relation holds: US1S0   0   UIS0   UIS1. Concerning the slopes of
the three indi↵erence curves, it holds:
@UIS1
@   
@UIS0
@    0  
@US1S0
@  .
The intuition of Proposition 1 is most easily explained at Figure 1.1. The
positive quadrant of (V,  ) space is sectioned into three regions showing for
which combinations of (V,  ) which constellation of organizational form and
e↵ort profile is optimal.
Figure 1.1: Indi↵erence curves using p = 12 ; c = 1; d =
2
10 ; µ1 =
3
10 and
µ0 =
2
10 .
The beauty of using indi↵erence curves is its clear separation of the entire
positive quadrant of the (V,  ) plane. For example, any point above US1S0
(blue line) reveals the optimality of S1 over S0. Vice versa, any point below
the optimality of S0 over S1. And as the name suggests, for any point on
this function the principal is indi↵erent between choosing S1 or S0.
Observe three patterns. Firstly, the rent-saving e↵ect of integration which is
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illustrated by the negative intersection of the V axis of both UIS0 (green line)
and UIS1(red line). The e↵ect is described by the first part of Proposition 1.
Both indi↵erence curves involving I have negative signs, i.e. in absence of
any reputational concerns the hiring costs of agent C are lower than for
agent A and B, irrespective of the incentivized e↵ort profile under separa-
tion. Secondly, the downside of reputational concerns under integration is
present which is seen by the positive slope. Only US1S0 has a positive inter-
section of the V axis capturing the fact that the cost of e↵ort is increased if
agent B is also incentivized after a first stage failure. Moreover, US1S0 has a
negative slope because under S1 agent B has more chances to show o↵ and
consequently is willing to exert e↵ort for a lower contingent payment, which
in turn is benefiting the principal. This e↵ect is captured by the second part
of Proposition 1. The third observation is the intersection point of all three
indi↵erence curves. Due to the nature of these three auxiliary functions this
unique combination is predictable as long as two indi↵erence curves inter-
sect. In this case, the third indi↵erence curve must necessarily lie on the
intersection point.
The principal’s choice depends on all three indi↵erence curves, because a
combination might for instance lie above US1S0 , suggesting S1 is the optimal
choice, but at the same time also lie above UIS1 . In this case, the principal
prefers I over S1. The di↵erently coloured areas I, II and III depict all
combinations for which either one organizational form and e↵ort profile is
dominating. In area I, integration I is best, in area II, S1 is best and in area
III, S0 is best.
So far, the participation constraint of the principal has not been taking into
account. If the principal’s expected utility is negative however, the optimal
choice is to leave the project uninvestigated and not to hire any agent. Incor-
porating the three participation constraint (US1   0 (beige line) , US0   0
(purple line) and UI   0 (turquoise line)) into Figure 1.1 leads to Figure 1.2,
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which depicts the optimal choices of the principal. Region X summarizes all
combinations of V and   for which the optimal choice is not to have investi-
gated the project at all. Both areas I and III from figure one are truncated by
all combinations which do not meet the participation constraint and trans-
form to XI and XIII, respectively. Any combination within region XI results
in integration as being the principal’s optimal choice. For area XIII, the best
choice is separation and not to incentivize the agent after a first-stage failure,
i.e. S0. Region II and XII coincide, as all combinations are fulfilling all three
participation constraints, in particular (US1   0). In this area, as before, S1
is the optimal choice.
Figure 1.2: S1 is the optimal choice in region XII, S0 in region XIII. Integra-
tion I is preferred in region XI, while region X represents all combinations
for which the principal prefers not to hire any agent.
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1.4 Discussion
The shirking incentive of agent C due to career concerns crucially hinges on
the assumption that the project is either of easy or of di cult type. Consider
there were only easy projects, then beside being economically non sense, the
principal has no intention to hire any agent and the question integration vs.
separation is obsolete. The case when all projects are di cult, however, has
already been part of research for instance in Schmitz (2005). In this case,
agent C has stronger incentives to exert e↵ort in the second stage after a first
stage success as two successes are the best signal of ability, given there are
no easy projects around.11 In practice, having projects of di↵erent degrees
of di culty seems to be realistic in many situations. Smircich and Cheeser
(1981) find superiors and subordinates often disagreeing on the level of dif-
ficulty which supports the assumption in our model of keeping the project’s
di culty unknown to all parties.
Our result of agent’s C shirking incentive does not only need projects of dif-
ferent type, but also a minimum share of easy projects, i.e. p   µ1 2d2d+3µ1 . If the
share of di cult projects is su ciently large, the incentive constraint in the
first stage is stronger than the second stage incentive constraint. Remember,
the incentivized e↵ort profile is still such that only after a first stage success
e↵ort is desired. The higher the share of di cult projects, the more likely
the agent exerts e↵ort in the first stage in vain. Investigating the impact
of the first constraint follows Schmitz (2005)’s work who finds an incentive
to shirk once the principal prefers the agent to exerted e↵ort irrespective
of the first stage outcome, in particular after a first stage failure. Antici-
pating the decreased success probabilities for the second stage, going along
with increased payments, the agent tends to shirk in the first stage. This
11In general, the larger the share of di cult projects, the higher the posterior belief
after two success, i.e. @Pr(smC |E
e
2=1,E
e
1=1)
@p =   (d+µ1)(2p+((d+µ1))(1 p))2 < 0.
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tendency is met by the principal o↵ering a higher wage. Our model extends
Schmitz (2005)’s model to career concerned agents and thus this argument
is present. Consider the incentive constraint of agent C for the first stage
given the principal desires the agent only to exert e↵ort in the second stage
after a success:
 
wC11
 1st   c+ c (Pr(Ee1 = 1)  Pr(Ene1 = 1))
PrI(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1)  PrI(Ee2 = 1, Ene1 = 1)
(1.18)
    Pr
I
(sm|Ee2 = 1, Ee1 = 1)
   Pr
I
(sm|Ee2 = 0, Ee1 = 1)
PrI(Ee2 = 0, E
e
1 = 1)  PrI(Ee2 = 0, Ene1 = 1)
PrI(Ee2 = 1, E
e
1 = 1)  PrI(Ee2 = 1, Ene1 = 1)
Remark that PrI(sm|Ee2 = 0, Ee1 = 1) = 1 and PrI(Ee2 = 0, Ene1 = 1) = 0
holds. Two important insights are highlighted. Firstly, for   = 0 and only
di cult projects, i.e. p = 0, the inequality
 
wC11
 1st
is stronger than wC11 which
reproduces Schmitz (2005)’s finding. Secondly, the e↵ect of career concerns is
negative, as the term in brackets translate to 12
p+(1 p)(d+µ1)
p+(1 p)(d+ 12µ1)
+ (1 d µ1)(d+µ1) . Since
the e↵ect of career concerns points likewise to separation, namely negative
with respect to the contingent payment, the more interesting case arises
once the second stage incentive constraint is binding, which is the focus of
our model.
1.5 Conclusion
Should a principal hire one or two agents for a two-staged project in case of
career concerned agents? We answered this question studying a two-staged
hidden action model with risk neutral agents exhibiting both limited liability
and career concerns. We find a well-known rent-saving e↵ect as an advantage
of hiring one agent who is in control for both stages. Incentives for the first
stage can then be saved as the agent would not miss the chance to receive
the second stage rent. This argument does not hold for the organizational
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form of separation, as then each agent needs to be incentivized in stage one
and two, respectively. Additionally, we find a novel shirking e↵ect under
integration. This e↵ect is due to reputational concerns and the type space
of considered projects. The best posterior belief the market can hold with
respect to the agent’s type is given after a first-stage success and a second
stage failure. The case vice versa is eliminated by assumption, i.e. the
principal always desires e↵ort in the first stage and then it is assumed that
a failure is a perfect signal of a dumb agent. The impact of a failure is
securing that the project type is di cult. As for only those kinds of projects,
the agent can prove himself. Since the principal is purely interested in a
second stage success, the o↵ered contingent payment for a failure is zero. In
order to incentivize the agent to exert e↵ort after a first stage success, the
payment must o↵set the agent’s career concerns. Consequently, reputational
concerns have negative implications under integration. At the same time,
these concerns benefit the principal under separation. Each agent only works
one stage and a success is always superior to a failure in terms of career
concerns. The o↵ered contingent payment is lowered the heavier the agent
considers his career concerns. Explicit incentives are substituted by implicit
incentives.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Preliminaries
Posterior Beliefs
The posterior beliefs the market holds are derived using Bayes’ theorem for
a given e↵ort profile, i.e.
Pr(smC |Ee2 = 1, Ee1= 1) =PrI(E
e
2=1,E
e
1=1|smC)
PrI(Ee2=1,Ee1=1)
Pr (smC)=
p+(1 p)(d+µ1)
p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1)
1
2 and
Pr(smC |Ene2 = 0, Ee1 = 1) = PrI(E
ne
2 =0,E
e
1=1|smC)
PrI(Ene2 =0,Ee1=1)
Pr (smC) =
(1 p)(1 d)
1
2 (1 p)(1 d)
1
2 = 1
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using PrI (Ene2 = 0, E
e
1 = 1) =
1
2 (1  p) 1  (1  d  1µ1µ1). The posterior be-
lief for agent B are given by:
Pr(smB|Ee2 = 1, Ee1 = 1) = p+
1
2 (1 p)(d+µ1)
p+ 12 (1 p)(d+ 12µ1)
1
2 and Pr(smB|Ee2 = 0, Ee1 =
1) = (1 d µ1)
(1 d  12µ1)
1
2 using PrS(E2 = 0, E1 = 1) =
1
2 (1  p) 1 
 
1  d  121µ1µ1
 
.
Analogously, it holds Pr(smB|Ee2 = 1, Ee1 = 0) = (d+µ0)(d+ 12µ0)
1
2 and Pr(smB|E2 =
0 , E1 = 0) =
(1 d µ0)
(1 d  12µ0)
1
2 . The posterior beliefs for agent A are also based
on both stage outcomes due to the assumptions on project type. For each
pair of events the market holds posterior beliefs: Pr(smA|E2 = 1, Ee1 = 1) =
p+(1 p)(d+1µ1µ1 12)
p+(1 p) 12(d+1µ1µ1 12)
1
2 and Pr(smA|E2 = 0, Ee1 = 1) =
(1 d 1µ1µ1 12)
1
2(1 d 1µ1µ1 12)
1
2 = 1.
In case of a first stage failure, the market holds the following beliefs with
respect to agent’s A type: Pr(smA|E2 = 1, Ee1 = 0) = (1 1)(d+1µ0µ0
1
2)
(1  12)(d+1µ0µ0 12)
1
2 = 0
and Pr(smA|E2 = 0, Ee1 = 0) = (1 1)(1 d 1µ0µ0
1
2)
(1  12)(1 d 1µ0µ0 12)
1
2 = 0.
Incentive constraints
Considering the incentive constraint of agent C as described by (1.16) re-
sults in: wC11   (p+
1
2 (1 p))
1
2 (1 p)µ1
c +   p
2(p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1))
. Considering the incen-
tive constraint of agent B as in (1.10) and (1.12) the following expres-
sions are derived: wB11   (1+p)(1 p) 2cµ1   12 
✓
p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1)
p+ 12 (1 p)(d+ 12µ1)
  (1 d µ1)
(1 d µ1 12)
◆
and
wB01   2 cµ0   12 
✓
(d+µ0)
(d+µ0 12)
  (1 d µ0)
(1 d µ0 12)
◆
. Using (1.8) the constraint considers
the expected posterior belief, thus
E[smA|Ee1 = 1] = PrS(E2 = 1|Ee1 = 1)Pr(smA|E2 = 1, Ee1 = 1) + PrS(E2 =
0|Ee1 = 1)Pr(smA|E2 = 0, Ee1 = 1) and E[smi|Ee1 = 0] = PrS(E2 = 1|Ee1 =
0)Pr(smA|E2 = 1, Ee1 = 0) + PrS(E2 = 0|Ee1 = 0)Pr(smA|E2 = 0 , Ee1 = 0).
Inserting the conditionally probabilities reduces the di↵erence substantially,
i.e. E[smA|Ee1 = 1]   E[smA|Ee1 = 0] = 1(1+p) . The constraint then equals:
wA1   2c(1 p)   1(1+p) .
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Utility of principal
The utility of the principal depends on her choice about the organizational
form and the e↵ort profile. Using both (1.13) and (1.14), and setting all
contingent payments optimally grants her the following utility:
UPS1 =
 
p+ (1  p)  d+ 14 (µ1 + µ0)  V   12 (1 + p)⇣ 2c(1 p)   1(1+p) ⌘
   p+ (1  p) 12  d+ 12µ1  ✓ (1+p)(1 p) 2cµ1   12  ✓ p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1)p+ 12 (1 p)(d+ 12µ1)   (1 d µ1)(1 d µ1 12)
◆◆
  (1  p)  1  12   d+ µ0 12 ✓2 cµ0   12  ✓ (d+µ0)(d+µ0 12)   (1 d µ0)(1 d µ0 12)
◆◆
.
UPS0 =
 
p+ (1  p)  d+ 14µ1  V   12 (1 + p)⇣ 2c(1 p)   1(1+p) ⌘
   p+ (1  p) 12  d+ 12µ1  ✓ (1+p)(1 p) 2cµ1   12  ✓ p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1)p+ 12 (1 p)(d+ 12µ1)   (1 d µ1)(1 d µ1 12)
◆◆
.
In case of integration the utility of the principal amounts to:
UPI =
 
p+ (1  p)  d+ 12µ1  V   (p+ 12 (1 p)(d+µ1))µ1 (1+p)(1 p)c  12p .
Indi↵erence curves
Based on these utilities, the three indi↵erence curves are derived:
US1S0 : US1   US0 , V   1µ0
✓
4(d+ 12µ0)
µ0
c  µ02 2d µ0 
◆
.
UIS1 : UI   US1 ,
V     1(µ1 µ0)
✓
2 (1+p)(1 p)
d(1 p)+2p+2µ1
µ1(1 p) + 4
(d+µ0 12)
µ0
◆
c+
1
(µ1 µ0)
⇣
(1+p)
(1 p)
(4 4d µ1)
(2 2d µ1) +
µ0
(2 2d µ0)
⌘
 .
UIS0 : UI   US0 , V   (1+p)(1 p)
⇣
 d(1 p)+2p+2µ11
2 (µ1)
2(1 p) c +
1
µ1
(4 4d µ1)
(2 2d µ1) 
⌘
.
1.6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The first part of this proposition translates to
4(d+ 12µ0)
(µ0)
2 c   0     (1+p)(1 p) d(1 p)+2p+2µ11
2 (µ1)
2(1 p) c    2
(1+p)
(1 p)
d(1 p)+2p+2µ1
µ1(1 p)
c
(µ1 µ0)
 4(d+µ0
1
2)
µ0
c
(µ1 µ0) . The first two relations directly are seen to be true due to
the assumptions made upon the parameters. The third inequality needs care-
ful investigation. It is equivalent to: 2 (1+p)(d(1 p)+2p+2µ1)(1 p)µ1(1 p)
⇣
1
(µ1)
  1(µ1 µ0)
⌘

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1
(µ1 µ0)
✓
4
(d+µ0 12)
µ0
◆
. Left-hand side is negative and right-hand side is non-
negative. The second part of this proposition translates to⇣
(1+p)
(1 p)
(4 4d µ1)
(2 2d µ1) +
µ0
(2 2d µ0)
⌘
1
(µ1 µ0)  
(1+p)
(1 p)
(4 4d µ1)
(2 2d µ1)
1
µ1
  0    
⇣
µ0
2 2d µ0
⌘
1
µ0
.
The first inequality is equivalent to, (1+p)(1 p) (4 4d µ1)(2 2d µ1) 1µ1 + 1(2 2d µ0)   0 . Both
summands are non-negative. The second and third inequality are true due
to assumptions made. q.e.d.
1.6.3 Numerical Evaluation
Inserting the following numbers: p = 12 , c = 1, d =
2
10 , µ1 =
3
10 and µ0 =
2
10
leads to the following three numerical versions of the indi↵erence curves:
US1S0 ! V   30   57 , UIS1 ! V   622091     740 and UIS0 ! V  
290
13     6803 . These are used in Figure 1.1. Based on the same numbers,
the three participation constraints are derived which are used in Figure 1.2:
UPS1   0! V   124053   44004823 , UPS0   0! V   118051   610663  and UPI   0! V  
10
27  +
250
27 .
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Essay 2: Transparency and Career Concerned
Experts
Kevin Remmy *
Abstract
A risk neutral principal hires a career conscious agent for a project choice decision
between a risky and a safe alternative. Depending on the underlying state of the
world each project might be ex post optimal. The agent can undertake unob-
servable e↵ort to receive better information which project to implement. In full
awareness of the incentive scheme, the principal decides upfront about the level of
information the market has access to. Either the market only knows the project
outcome (intransparent case) or additionally knows which project had been imple-
mented (transparent case). The principal might favor transparency, even when it
comes at a cost, due to increased incentives to exert e↵ort which are induced by a
superior inference capability by the market with respect to the agent’s type.
*Institute for Organization and Human Resource Management, University of Bern, En-
gehaldenstr. 4, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland, e-mail: kevin.remmy@iop.unibe.ch. I thank
Frauke von Bieberstein, Florian Englmaier and participants of the internal seminar at the
University of Bern for helpful comments. All errors are mine.
30
2.1 Introduction
The importance for most people to be favorably perceived by others has been
vastly studied ever since the seminal paper by Holmstro¨m (1982/99) who
formalized Fama (1980)’s idea.1 Particularly present is the desire within a
business environment, as climbing up the career ladder usually involves be-
ing beneficially perceived by the job market. The term ”career concerns”
has become standard for these considerations. Our model joins the line of
research focusing on agents exhibiting career concerns for expertise, i.e. the
ability of the agents to gather and process information. Consider facing a
project choice between a risky and a safe alternative of which each might be
ex post optimal depending on the underlying state of the world. A career-
conscious agent can undertake some costly e↵ort to be in a better position
informational-wise, before deciding which project to implement. Within that
branch of research one question naturally arises: what is optimal degree of
information an outside party has access to? We focus on two di↵erent degrees
of information: intransparency and transparency. If an outside party only
receives the outcome of the project as information, then it is called intrans-
parent. Transparency on the other hand allows the outside party additional
information, namely which of the two projects has been implemented. Prat
(2005) argues that transparency might result in ine cient use of information
due to a distortional e↵ect towards actions likely made by smart agents, which
are not necessarily e cient.2 In contrast, Bar-Isaac (2012) finds that trans-
parency benefits the incentives to exert e↵ort. However, his result depends
on an exogenously given risk premium which distorts the career concerned
agents project choice.
Our model contributes to the career concern literature by showing that trans-
parency boosts the information gathering incentives even in the absence of
1For an overview, see for instance Prendergast (1999).
2See also Brandenburger and Polak (1996) and Levy (2007) for similar arguments.
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any risk premium. On the broader perspective, our findings add to the on-
going debate whether or not career concerns have positive consequences.3
The intuition of our result is linked to market’s inference with respect to the
agent’s type. Transparency allows the market to infer from more relevant
information compared to intransparency. Anticipating the better chances to
prove himself, the agent has increased incentives to exert e↵ort.
Milbourn et al. (2001) were the first to extend the career concerns literature
to situations with agents whose unobservable, but costly e↵ort supports pro-
cessing and gathering information, instead of adding to productivity. Hence,
these models endogenize expertise, i.e. the quality of relevant information
a decision maker has access to. Milbourn et al. (2001) find an over invest-
ment4 in information by a career conscious agent. They link good projects
to the type space such that observing an implementation of a good project
let the market believe a rather more capable agent was at work. Milbourn
et al. (2001) assume that only implementation allows for inference by the
market. This one-sided distortion leads to the result of over investment in in-
formation by decreasing the probability of implementing bad projects. Their
result thus crucially hinges on the assumption that rejecting serves as a safe
haven for the agent in terms of his reputation.5 Since rejecting does not allow
the market to update any information, the agent does not face the risk of a
reputational loss.
Suurmond et al. (2004) alter the information gathering mechanism such
that a safe haven is no longer necessary for the results. They find that
3For instance, within a sequential setting Scharfstein and Stein (1990) find career
concerned agents to ignore valuable private information in order not to appear di↵erent
to the other agents in terms of private information. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) on the
other hand propose an optimal contract which includes implicit incentives based on career
concerns.
4The costs are borne by the firm in their model, instead of being carried by the agent.
5As a matter of fact, if the market always observes the correctness of the agents choice,
then the posterior belief must equal the prior belief of the agent’s type as exerting e↵ort
does not per se increase the probability of having a good project.
32
reputational concerns by the agent are welfare enhancing if the agent does
not know his type. If the agent however knows his type, then the e↵ect of
reputational concerns on welfare is less clear. While a dumb agent optimally
undertakes ine cient actions to mimic a smart agent, the smart agent has
enlarged incentives to exert e cient e↵ort to distinguish himself from the
dumb agent. Which e↵ect dominates, depends on the specific parameters.
Most closely related to our model is Bar-Isaac (2012) who also finds a pos-
itive e↵ect of transparency on the incentives to exert e↵ort. However, an
exogenously given risk premium is required. We find an inventive boosting
consequence of transparency even in the absence of such a risk premium. The
intuition behind this result is found in the di↵erences in modeling the safe
alternative. In Bar-Isaac (2012) the safe project serves as a safe haven with
respect to the project outcome and to the beliefs about the agent’s type. The
project outcome is fixed and the beliefs are not updated, i.e. the posterior
beliefs equal the priors. Having the outcome of a safe project independent
of the underlying state seems quite plausible, the assumption, however, that
choosing the safe project does not carry any relevant information appears
to be far too rigid. One consequence of this safe haven is the absence of an
innate e↵ect of transparency. As defined by the degree of information the
market has access to, transparency allows the market to be sure about the
agent’s implementation decision. This additional information though, is not
relevant due to the characteristics of a safe haven. In our model the agent’s
choice to implement the safe alternative does indeed carry some relevant in-
formation about the agent’s type. Hence, transparency is inherently present
in our model and augments the information gathering incentives. The reason
why choosing the safe alternative reveals some information about the agent’s
type is found in the way exerting e↵ort works. While in Bar-Isaac (2012)
exerting e↵ort supports the decision which of the two risky project to imple-
ment, leaving aside the safe action, our model incorporates the safe action
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such that exerting e↵ort directs to either, the risky or the safe alternative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces the
basic model including the timing of the game. Section 2.3 analyzes the e↵ect
of transparency on the e↵ort incentives. Section 2.4 presents a discussion
and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Basic Model
A risk neutral principal delegates a project choice decision to a risk neutral
agent who exhibits career concerns. The choice is between two projects, (1)
and (2). Let x 2 X denote the project outcome which potentially depends
on the state of the world. There exist two equally likely states, S1 and S2 .
For project (1) we assume the expected project outcome to depend on the
underlying state of the world, while for project (2) the expected outcome is
irrespective of the realized state. For this reason, project (1) is declared as
risky and project (2) as safe. Which project to implement is for the agent
to decide. He can investigate the projects by exerting some costly e↵ort
before the decision. The agent receives a signal si with i = 1, 2 indicat-
ing either underlying state. The quality of the signal depends on both, the
level of e↵ort and the agent’s type. The agent is either smart (sm) with
probability ↵ 2 (0, 1) or dumb (du) with probability 1   ↵. No one, not
even the agent himself, knows his type. We assume that the signal per-
fectly indicates which state occurred if the agent is smart and informed. The
probability of being informed is captured by ⇡ (e) 2 [0, 1] with @⇡(e)@e > 0
and @
2⇡(e)
(@e)2
< 0, using the exerted e↵ort level as its argument. With prob-
ability 1   ⇡ (e) the agent is uninformed and the signal then is assumed to
carry pure noise. A dumb agent is assumed to be always uninformed, hence
his received signal is pure noise even if he has exerted e↵ort. The cost of
e↵ort is c (e) 2 [0,1) with @c(e)@e > 0 and @
2c(e)
(@e)2
> 0. The employed infor-
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mation gathering process has been introduced by Suurmond et al. (2004)
and is summarized by the conditional probability of a state occurring given
a signal: Pr(S1|s1) = ↵
 
⇡(e) + (1  ⇡(e)) 12
 
+ (1  ↵) 12 = 12(1 + ↵⇡(e)).
Due to symmetry of state and signal, it holds Pr(S1|s1) = Pr(S2|s2). Simi-
larly, the conditional probabilities for conflicting state and signal are derived:
Pr(S1|s2) = 12(1 ↵⇡(e)) = Pr(S2|s1). While the information process is iden-
tical to the approach by Suurmond et al. (2004), the payo↵ structure of the
two projects is not. The set of outcomes has four elements, X = { 12 , 0, 12 , 1}.
The following matrices capture the outcomes depending on the state of the
world:
Project (1)
State
S1 S2
Lottery
1
2 1
1
2
1
2 0  12
Project (2)
State
S1 S2
Lottery
1
2
1
2 0
1
2 0
1
2
Consider choosing project (1) when the underlying state is S2, then the
equally likely outcomes x = 12 or x =  12 might occur. The payo↵ structure
contains four defining properties with E(i)[x] using i = 1, 2 representing the
expected outcome x of implementing either project (1) or project (2).
(i) E(1)[x] = E(2)[x]   0
(ii) E(1)[x| S1] > E(2)[x| S1] & E(2)[x| S2] > E(1)[x| S2]
(iii) E(1)[x| S1]  E(1)[x| S2] 6= 0 & E(2)[x| S1]  E(2)[x| S2] = 0
(iv) 9 x 2 X which occurs in both projects
The properties (i) and (ii) ensure non existence of a dominating project by
having the same non-negative unconditional outcome (i) but depending on
the state one project is superior to the other (ii). The third property says that
the expected conditional outcome of one specific project might depend on
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the underlying state. This property allows for distinction between risky and
safe projects. Project (1) is declared as risky due to the expected outcome’s
reliance on the underlying state. A direct implication of the properties is that
E(1)[x| S1] > E(1)[x] > E(1)[x| S2]. For the same reason is project (2) seen
as safe, E(2)[x| S1] = E(2)[x] = E(2)[x| S2]. The fourth property expresses
the fact that information about the realized outcome does not serve as a
perfect signal for the implemented project, namely the outcomes x = 0 and
x = 12 do not allow for perfect inference. The imperfect inference of the
outcome lays the path for the concept of transparency, as it represents the
degree of information the market has access to. The market is aware of the
payo↵ structure, but cannot distinguish between the two projects in case of
intransparency. The only observation for the market is the realization of
X. For a transparent organization the market gets to know which project
had been implemented in addition to the observed outcome. The principal
knows which project has been chosen. Making the organization transparent
comes at a cost k > 0. Both environments would lead to the same, if not
for property (iv). The inherent fair lottery over outcomes is necessary for
the feasibility of the properties within this two state - two project situation.6
The results of this paper hinge on these four properties and by no means
on the quantitative character of the payo↵ structure. Thus, any structure
fulfilling these properties leads to the same qualitative results.
The agent exhibits career concerns. He weighs his career concerns with the
scalar     0. For career concerns being meaningful, a smart agent should act
6To see this consider the following payo↵ structure without a lottery:
(1) S1 S2
V W
(2) S1 S2
X Y
with V,W,X, Y 2 R
The third property requires Y = X. The fourth requires that at least one outcome appears
in both, so take for instance V = X. As a result of the first property it must then hold
W = X . Hence, all four outcomes are the same. Besides being a trivial payo↵ structure,
the second property is not fulfilled.
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di↵erently than a dumb agent, at least on the margin. The second property of
the payo↵ structure serves exactly this purpose. Given the state S1, project
(1) is the right and project (2) the wrong choice. Vice versa it holds for the
state S2. Due to the information gathering process a right choice is more
likely made by a smart agent.
Ultimately, the principal is interested in the outcome of the project. In
order to increase the probability of implementing the correct project, she lets
an agent exert e↵ort to investigate the projects. The principal anticipates
that the agent welcomes this opportunity to show o↵ and gain the project’s
outcome, and hence she demands a price pi with i = I, T paid by the agent.7
Her utility is then given by UP (pi) = pi   1kk with 1k being an indicator
function, i.e. 1k = 1 if the principal decides for transparency, and 1k = 0
otherwise. The principal bears entirely the cost of making the organization
transparent.
The utility function of the agent contains four components additively: UA(e) =
E[x]+ E[sm] pi c(e). Firstly, the expected project outcome. The second
component captures the career concerns. Thirdly, the agent has to pay the
price pi to the principal in order to be able to investigate the project. The
price depends on the environment, as the principal might ask di↵erent prices
for each. The fourth part of the agent’s utility function shows that the agent
bears entirely the costs of exerting unobservable e↵ort.
7The considered contract is called a ”sell-the-shop” contract and has become standard
within our assumptions made, namely both the agent and the principal are risk neutral
and the agent does not su↵er any limited liability.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5
-
nature principal agent agent agent payments
chooses decides on accepts chooses decides on are made
type transparency contract e↵ort project and posteriors
of agent and pi are updated
At stage 0, nature determines the agent’s type which is not made public to
any party. At stage 1 the principal decides which degree of information the
market shall have access to. Either the market only receives the information
of the project outcome (intransparency) or it also knows which project the
agent has chosen (transparency). Then, the principal optimally chooses the
price pi which the agent needs to pay if he accepts the contract in stage 2.
The agent decides on his e↵ort at stage 3. In stage 4, he receives a signal
and then chooses which project to implement. At the very end, the random
variable realizes, payments are made accordingly and the market updates via
Bayesian updating.
2.3 Main Results
The Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium concept is applied. The market
processes all accessible information via Bayesian updating. The considered
strategy of the agent is to exert e↵ort and to follow his signal. The strat-
egy of the agent is applied to evaluate the distribution function over four
di↵erent values of the outcome x. Consider for instance the realization of
the outcome x = 0. Given the agent’s strategy this outcome might oc-
cur following either signal. In case of s = s1, the signal must be true and
in case of s = s2 the outcome x = 0 might occur in both states. Tak-
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ing the inherent lottery into account, the probability of the outcome is de-
rived: Pr(x = 0) = Pr(s1) Pr(S1|s1)12 + Pr(s2)
 
Pr(S2|s2)12 + Pr(S1|s2)12
 
=
1
8(3 + ↵⇡(e)). Analogously, the probabilities of the three other outcomes
are derived, given the assumed agent’s strategy to exert e↵ort and to fol-
low his signal: Pr(x = 12) =
1
8(3   ↵⇡(e)), Pr(x = 1) = 18(1 + ↵⇡(e)),
Pr(x =  12) = 18(1  ↵⇡(e)).
Career concerns are captured by the posterior belief of the market with re-
spect to type. The market uses any relevant and accessible information to
infer on agent’s type. The outcome x is always made public and hence used.
The additional information about which project has been implemented is
only available if the principal had decided to make the organization trans-
parent. Consequently, the posterior beliefs the market holds are potentially
di↵erent for transparency and intransparency. Let Pr (sm|x) denote the pos-
terior belief that the agent is smart conditionally on the outcome x = x.
Similarily, Pr (sm|x, s) denotes the posterior belief that the agent is smart
conditionally on the outcome x = x and the signal s = s. Note, condition-
ing on signals is equivalent to using the implemented projects. The reason
lies in the assumed strategy of the agent who always follows his signal. Be-
liefs are highest if the agent did the right choice and moreover, the market
is able to distinguish whether or not the agent did the right choice, i.e.
Pr(sm| x = 1) = Pr(x=1|sm) Pr(sm)Pr(x=1) =
1
8 (1+⇡(eˆ))
1
8 (1+↵⇡(eˆ))
↵. The worst on the contrary is
having knowingly implemented the wrong project. In between are the prior
and those beliefs where the market cannot perfectly infer. The following
relation holds:
Pr(sm| x = 1)   Pr(sm)   Pr(sm| x =  1
2
)
,
1
8(1 + ⇡(eˆ))
1
8(1 + ↵⇡(eˆ))
↵   ↵  
1
8(1  ⇡(eˆ))
1
8(1  ↵⇡(eˆ))
↵ (2.1)
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In equilibrium the market holds a correct belief about the exerted e↵ort
level e. Therefore, the notation eˆ is used for any posterior belief and,
hence for any Bernoulli utility function8 u (·) which determines the utility
of having implemented one of the two projects for a given state. The no-
tation ui(1)(eˆ|S1) with i = I, T is used to represent the agent’s utility once
project (1) has been implemented and the underlying state of the world is
S = S1. For instance, consider the case that the principal has chosen intrans-
parency, then the outcomes x = 1 or x = 0 can occur. Both outcomes are
equally likely, uses by the market and balanced by the career concern param-
eter  , i.e. uI(1)(eˆ|S1) = E(1)[x|S1] +  
 
1
2 Pr(sm|x = 1) + 12 Pr(sm|x = 0)
 
=
1
2 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
. Due to the proposed strategy by the agent
to follow his signal, the probability of reaching uI(1)(eˆ|S1) equals the joint
probability that the signal s = s1 and the state S = S1 occurred, hence
Pr(S1, s1) = Pr(s1) Pr(S1|s1). The agent’s von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function U (·) captures the reaching probabilities and the Bernoulli utilities:
UAi (e) = Pr(S1, s1)u
i
(1)(eˆ|S1) + Pr (S2, s1) ui(1)(eˆ|S2) (2.2)
+ Pr(S1, s2)u
i
(2)(eˆ|S1) + Pr (S2, s2) ui(2)(eˆ|S2)  c(e)
The agent maximizes U i (e) over e↵ort e.9 Due to the second part of the
third property of the payo↵ structure the utility is independent of the under-
lying state when the safe project is chosen, as expected profit is the same for
both states. Since the outcomes for both states are symmetric, the posterior
beliefs with respect to type have to be the same.10 This observation holds for
both environments and reduces the considered maximization problem sub-
8Contrary to von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, the Bernoulli utility function
is not defined over a lottery but over sure events. Compare p.184 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
9The utility function is concave in e↵ort e due to the assumption made on ⇡(e) and
c(e). Moreover, parameters are such that exerting at least some positive e↵ort is optimal.
10Note that neither the principal nor the market are able to observe the state. While the
principal can always observe the outcome and the project choice, the market can observe
the outcome and in case of transparency also the project choice.
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stantially, given ui(2)(eˆ|S1) = ui(2)(eˆ|S2) = ui(2)(eˆ). Inserting the binary sig-
nal structure and the information gathering information process accordingly
leads to:
U i(e) =
1
4
 
ui(1)(eˆ|S1) + ui(1)(eˆ|S2)
 
+
1
4
↵⇡(e)
 
ui(1)(eˆ|S1)  ui(1)(eˆ|S2)
 
(2.3)
+
1
2
ui(2)(eˆ)  c(e)
So far, we have assumed that the agent exerts e↵ort, receives and follows his
signal. Before the optimal e↵ort level is derived, the next lemma establishes
the second part of the proposed strategy.
Lemma 1 If the agent exerts some e↵ort, then it is optimal for him to follow
his signal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is found in the assumed combination of risk
neutrality and information gathering process. Given some e↵ort, the infor-
mativeness of the signal is not trivial, i.e. Pr(S1|s1) > 12 , compared to the
prior Pr (S1) =
1
2 . Hence, following his signal is then beneficial on aver-
age. If no e↵ort is exerted however, the signal carries only noise, compare
Pr(S1|s1) = Pr(S1|s2) = 12 . The equilibrium e↵ort level e⇤i is defined by set-
ting the first-order condition (FOC) of (2.3) to zero. Any perfect Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium requires that the market holds a correct belief about the
agent’s e↵ort, i.e. eˆ = e⇤i .
1
4
↵
@⇡(e)
@e
|e=e⇤i
 
ui(1)(eˆ|S1)  ui(1)(eˆ|S2)
 
=
@c(e)
@e
|e=e⇤i (2.4)
The benefit of e↵ort is driven by the di↵erence between the Bernoulli utilities
of correctly and wrongly implementing the risky project 4i = ui(1)(eˆ|S1)  
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ui(1)(eˆ|S2). The next lemma establishes the relation between this di↵erence
and the implied optimal e↵ort level.
Lemma 2 The e↵ort level e⇤i implied by (2.4) increases if 4i increases.
Proof. See the Appendix.
One immediate consequence of Lemma 2 concerns the decision about trans-
parency. When the principal decides about transparency, she anticipates the
e↵ect on the agent’s e↵ort choice. Using Lemma 2, investigating the impact
boils down to its impact on the di↵erence 4i. Let e⇤I(e⇤T ) denote the opti-
mal e↵ort the agent chooses under intransparency (transparency). The next
lemma shows a positive e↵ect of transparency on the agent’s e↵ort decision.
Lemma 3 The agent exerts more e↵ort when the principal chooses trans-
parency, i.e. e⇤T   e⇤I .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 3 is found in the increased inference capability of the
market under transparency. That is why transparency enhances the incen-
tives to gather information. The market can tell for any outcome whether
the agent did the right or wrong decision. The market is not able to say
this for the outcomes x = 0 and x = 12 if the principal has decided for in-
transparency, as both outcomes might occur in both projects. The posterior
beliefs for these two outcomes are in between the best (right decision) and
worst (wrong decision) and thus the di↵erence 4I is not as large as 4T .
The principal’s decision about transparency takes the consequences on the
agent’s decision to exert e↵ort into consideration. The following proposition
describes the unique equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 1 Assume 18↵ (⇡ (e
⇤
T )  ⇡ (e⇤I))   c (e⇤T )   c (e⇤I) + k, then the
principal chooses transparency. The agent chooses e⇤T such that the corre-
sponding equation (2.4) holds, i.e. 14↵
@⇡(e)
@e
⇣
uT(1)(eˆ|S1)  uT(1)(eˆ|S2)
⌘
=@c(e)@e .
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And he follows his signal. In case of c (e⇤T ) c (e⇤I)+k   18↵ (⇡ (e⇤T )  ⇡ (e⇤I)),
the principal chooses intransparency. The agent chooses e⇤I such that the
equation 14↵
@⇡(e)
@e
⇣
uI(1)(eˆ|S1)  uI(1)(eˆ|S2)
⌘
=@c(e)@e holds and follows his signal.
In both cases the market holds beliefs about the agent’s type which are derived
using Bayesian updating.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The result of Proposition 1 is counterbalancing the positive and negative
e↵ects of transparency. The benefit of transparency is the enhanced inference
capability of the market which in turn incentivizes the agent to increased
e↵ort. By exerting e↵ort the agent shifts the probability of making the right
decision and preventing from implementing the wrong one. In equilibrium
however, the agent cannot outplay the market in terms of his type, because
he has no informational advantage to draw on. Neither he nor the market
knows his type. The drawback of transparency is the cost to transform the
organization into a transparent one. From the principal’s perspective, the
decision to choose between transparency and intransparency is in favor of the
latter if the cost of increased e↵ort and the cost of transparency k outweigh
the increased success probabilities due to the higher level of e↵ort.
2.4 Discussion
The realization of the agent’s type remains unknown throughout the entire
game. As a result, no adverse selection problem is present. Even though the
agent’s e↵ort is unobservable, a moral hazard problem is not an issue either.
The optimal e↵ort levels chosen by the agent are first-best e↵ort levels which
is a standard result if ”sell-the-Shop” contracts are available. Incorporating
this fact, the same results are derived by modeling only the agent leaving the
principal aside. In this modification the agent receives the project outcome
and works for the principal in her best interests. For example, Suurmond et
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al. (2004), Milbourn et al. (2001) and Bar-Isaac (2012) do not model the
principal explicitly due to the same reason. Nevertheless, we found that the
decision about the degree of transparency suits a principal much better than
an agent.
Our results depend crucially on the assumption that the market is not in a
position to tell which project has been implemented unless a.) the principal
wants it to or b.) the outcome allows for a perfect inference to the project
choice. The concept of transparency makes only sense given this assumption.
In practice however, this assumption appears not to be too harsh, since firms
are often very keen on holding back precise information from any outside
party.
We assumed a cost attached to making an organization transparent. In prac-
tice, this assumption is easily met since transparency is modeled such that
additional information is gathered and made accessible to the market. Both
steps require resources which are not needed in case of intransparency. In the-
ory, this assumption is necessary to ensure a trade-o↵ between transparency
and intransparency, as in absence of any cost, i.e. k = 0, the inequality
of Proposition 1 in favor of transparency reduces to 18↵ (⇡ (e
⇤
T )  ⇡ (e⇤I))  
c (e⇤T )   c (e⇤I). This inequality is always met due to the concavity of the
agent’s utility function.
2.5 Conclusion
Our project choice model considers the consequences of transparency on the
incentives to exert e↵ort by a career conscious agent and sheds light on the
optimality of transparency. We find that transparency has a positive ef-
fect on the agent’s incentive to exert unobservable, but costly e↵ort. Since
transparency causes a better inference capability by the market due to more
relevant and accessible information. This in turn boosts a career concerned
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agent as making a right project choice improves his reputation significantly.
Likewise, making a wrong project choice results in a severe damage of his rep-
utation. The principal then prefers transparency to intransparency whenever
the costs of transparency are o↵set by its benefits.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Preliminaries
For an intransparent environment, the agent’s utility of choosing project
(1) in presence of S1 is uI(1)(eˆ|S1) = 12 + 12↵ 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
and in
presence of S2: uI(1)(eˆ|S2) = 12↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(1 ⇡(eˆ))
(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
. If the agent chooses
to implement project (2), then his utility is irrespective of the state: uI(2)(eˆ) =
1
4 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
. In case of transparency things are a bit more
involved. If the agent chooses (1) upon receiving a truthful signal s1 his
utility is uT(1)(e|S1, s1) = 12 + ↵  (1+⇡(eˆ))(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) . Is the signal not truthful however,
his utility is uT(1)(e|S2, s1) = ↵  (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ)) . Choosing (1) upon a signal s2 the
utilities change to uT(1)(e|S1, s2) = 12 + 12↵  and uT(1)(e|S2, s2) = 12↵ . Does
the agent decide to implement project (2), then his utilty is uT(2)(e|s1) =
1
4 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(1 ⇡(e))
(1 ↵⇡(e)) +
(1+⇡(e))
(1+↵⇡(e))
⌘
upon receiving s1 and uT(2)(e|s2) = 14 + ↵ 
otherwise.
2.6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given s = s1, choosing project (1) must grant higher utility than choosing
(2). This must hold for both environments.
(i) Pr(S1|s1)uI(1)(eˆ|S1) + Pr (S2|s1) uI(1)(eˆ|S2)   uI(2)(eˆ) and
(ii) Pr(S1|s1)uT(1)(eˆ|S1, s1) + Pr (S2|s1) uT(1)(eˆ|S2, s1)   uT(2)(eˆ|s1) must hold.
Inserting the conditional probabilities and the Bernoulli utilities leads to:
(i) $ 12(1 + ↵⇡(e))
⇣
1
2 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘⌘
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+12(1  ↵⇡(e))12↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(1 ⇡(eˆ))
(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
  14 + 12↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
(i) $ ⇡(e)  + ↵⇡(e)
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))   (3 ⇡(eˆ))(3 ↵⇡(eˆ))   (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
 ⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(1 ⇡(eˆ))
(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
Inequality is fulfilled since right-hand side (RHS) is less than second sum-
mand of left-hand side (LHS) and first summand of LHS is positive.
(ii) $ 12(1 + ↵⇡(e))
⇣
1
2 + ↵ 
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
+ 12(1  ↵⇡(e))
⇣
↵  (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
 
1
4 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(1 ⇡(e))
(1 ↵⇡(e)) +
(1+⇡(e))
(1+↵⇡(e))
⌘
(ii) $ ⇡(e)2  + 2  
⇣
(1 ⇡(e))
(1 ↵⇡(e)) +
(1+⇡(e))
(1+↵⇡(e))
⌘
Again, inequality is fulfilled since first summand of LHS is positive and second
summand of LHS is larger than RHS.
Analogously, if the signal is s = s2, choosing project (2) must be preferred
to choosing project (1). This must hold for both environments:
(I) uI(2)(eˆ)   Pr(S1|s2)uI(1)(eˆ|S1) + Pr (S2|s2) uI(1)(eˆ|S2) and
(II) uT(2)(e|s2)   Pr(S1|s2)uT(1)(eˆ|S1, s2) + Pr (S2|s2) uT(1)(eˆ|S2, s2).
Inserting the conditional probabilities and the Bernoulli utilities leads to:
(I) $ 14 + 12↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
 
1
2(1  ↵⇡(e))
⇣
1
2 +
1
2↵ 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘⌘
+
1
2(1 + ↵⇡(e))
⇣
1
2↵ 
⇣
(3 ⇡(eˆ))
(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(1 ⇡(eˆ))
(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘⌘
(I) $ 8↵(1 ↵)⇡(eˆ)2(5 ⇡(eˆ)2↵2)9+⇡(eˆ)4↵4 10⇡(eˆ)2↵2    ⇡ 
LHS is positive and RHS is negative.
(II) $ 14 + ↵    12(1  ↵⇡(e))
 
1
2 +
1
2↵ 
 
+ 12(1 + ↵⇡(e))
1
2↵ 
(II) $ ↵     12↵⇡(e).
LHS is positive and RHS is negative, thus all four inequalities hold. q.e.d.
2.6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2 states that for 41 > 42 ) e⇤1 > e⇤2 and is proven by contradiction.
Using (2.4) 14↵
@⇡(e)
@e 4j = @c(e)@e with 4j =
⇣
ui(1)(eˆ|S1)  ui(1)(eˆ|S2)
⌘
, let us
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define e⇤1 : 41 =
4 @c(e)@e |e=e⇤1
↵ @⇡(e)@e |e=e⇤1
and e⇤2 : 42 =
4 @c(e)@e |e=e⇤2
↵ @⇡(e)@e |e=e⇤2
. Assume41 > 42, which
is equivalent to
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
>
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
and presume that e⇤2 > e
⇤
1 holds. Then
this leads to @c(e)@e |e=e⇤2 > @c(e)@e |e=e⇤1 and @⇡(e)@e |e=e⇤1 > @⇡(e)@e |e=e⇤2 , thus
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
<
1 and
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
> 1 and results in a contradiction. Then presume e⇤1 = e
⇤
2,
then
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
=
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
, which leads to a contradiction as well. Leaves the
third option that e⇤1 > e
⇤
2 which leads to
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@⇡(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
> 1 and
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤2
@c(e)
@e |e=e⇤1
< 1.
q.e.d.
2.6.4 Proof of Lemma 3
The equilibrium e↵ort e⇤I fulfills
1
8
@⇡(e)
@e 4I = @c(e)@e with the di↵erence param-
eter 4I =
⇣
uI(1)(eˆ|S1)  uI(1)(eˆ|S2)
⌘
and e⇤T fulfills
1
8
@⇡(e)
@e 4T = @c(e)@e with
4T =
⇣
uT(1)(eˆ|S1, s1)  uT(1)(eˆ|S2, s1)
⌘
. Due to lemma 1, showing 4T  
4I is su cient. Considering the following di↵erences for intransparency
uI(1)(eˆ|S1) uI(1)(eˆ|S2) = 12 + 12↵ 
⇣
(1+⇡(eˆ))
(1+↵⇡(eˆ)) +
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))   (3 ⇡(eˆ))(3 ↵⇡(eˆ))   (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
⌘
and transparency uT(1)(e|S1, s1) uT(1)(e|S2, s1) = 12 +↵  (1+⇡(eˆ))(1+↵⇡(eˆ))  ↵  (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))
allows for: 4T   4I , (1+⇡(eˆ))(1+↵⇡(eˆ))   (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ)) > (3+⇡(eˆ))(3+↵⇡(eˆ))   (3 ⇡(eˆ))(3 ↵⇡(eˆ)) ,
9  ⇡(eˆ)2↵2 > 3 (1  ⇡(eˆ)2↵2). q.e.d.
2.6.5 Proof of Proposition 1
Presume that the principal has decided to make the organization intrans-
parent. Then she maximizes the price pI taking into account the agent’s
incentive constraint. If the agent is indi↵erent then it is assumed that she
participates and is incentivized. Consequently, the maximum price the agent
would pay is: p⇤I = U
A
I (e
⇤
I) UAI (e = 0). Analogously, p⇤T is derived for trans-
parency: p⇤T = U
A
T (e
⇤
T ) UAT (e = 0). The principal then decides to make the
costly transition to an transparent environment whenever her utility of trans-
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parency is larger than her utility of intranspareny, which is equivalent in our
model to maximizing the social welfare. The sum of both, the agent’s and
the principal’s utility equals the social welfare. The principal then prefers
transparency whenever the following inequality holds: UAT (e
⇤
T ) + U
P
T (p
⇤
T )  
UAI (e
⇤
I) + U
P
I (p
⇤
I). After inserting the utilities this inequality reduces to:
1
4 +↵ +
1
8↵⇡(e
⇤
T )  p⇤T   c (e⇤T )+ p⇤T  k   14 +↵ + 18↵⇡(e⇤I)  p⇤I   c (e⇤I)+ p⇤I
, 18↵ (⇡(e⇤T )  ⇡(e⇤I))   c (e⇤T )  c (e⇤I) + k.
The last part contains the posterior beliefs held by the market, given the
described strategy by the agent and the principal. For intransparency, the
market holds the following: Pr(sm|x =  12) = (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))↵, Pr(sm|x = 0) =
(3+⇡(eˆ))
(3+↵⇡(eˆ))↵, Pr(sm|x = 12) = (3 ⇡(eˆ))(3 ↵⇡(eˆ))↵ and Pr(sm|x = 1) = (1+⇡(eˆ))(1+↵⇡(eˆ))↵. For
transparency, the following holds: Pr(sm| x =  12 , s1) = Pr(sm| x = 12 , s1)
= (1 ⇡(eˆ))(1 ↵⇡(eˆ))↵, Pr(sm| x = 0, s1) = Pr(sm| x = 1, s1) = (1+⇡(eˆ))(1+↵⇡(eˆ))↵, Pr(sm| x =
 12 , s2) = Pr(sm| x = 1, s2) = 0 and Pr(sm| x = 0, s2) = Pr(sm| x = 12 , s2)
= 12 . q.e.d.
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Essay 3: Career Concerns for Experts using
Hybrid Incentives
Kevin Remmy *
Abstract
We extend the Career Concern literature on the interplay between explicit and
implicit incentives by introducing a hybrid incentive which is at the same time
contract-contingent and market-driven. Consider a principal hiring a career con-
scious agent to evaluate a project. The market gains information about the quality
of the agent’s decision only if the project is implemented unless the principal de-
cides to double-check also rejected projects. Double-checking rejected projects does
not undue the implementation decision but solely generates information about the
correctness of the agents decision. Precisely, the probability of a double-check is
contractually arranged but induction of e↵ort is market-driven. The agent antic-
ipates the additional information of the market and then optimally exerts e↵ort.
We find that this hybrid incentive is superior to a pure explicit incentive whenever
the prior probability of implementing correctly is su ciently high.
*Institute for Organization and Human Resource Management, University of Bern,
Engehaldenstr. 4, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland, e-mail: kevin.remmy@iop.unibe.ch. I am
grateful to Frauke von Bieberstein for helpful comments. All errors are mine.
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3.1 Introduction
The analysis of incentives for individuals has been one of the major research
fields in principal agent theory in the last decades.1 Inducing intended
behavior by setting incentives appropriately forms the core of the theory,
which sharply distinguishes between explicit, contract-contingent and im-
plicit, market-driven incentives. While the explicit incentives are precisely
set by the party writing the contract (principal), implicit incentives are not.
Following Fama (1980) and Holmstro¨m (1982/99) these incentives are en-
forced by a perfectly competitive labor market (for agents) ensuring paying
wages at the level of their expected productivity. The prospect of high com-
pensation in the future disciplines the agent’s present performance. Ever
since Gibbons and Murphy (1992), the interplay between these two types of
incentives has been of particular interest. They find implicit incentives are
more e↵ective at early stages and explicit ones at later stages. The closer to
retirement, the less attractive are implicit incentives due to a shorter period
of time benefiting from an increased reputation.
Our model contributes to the literature by introducing a hybrid incentive
which is at the same time contract-contingent but also market-driven. Con-
sider a risk-neutral principal who hires a career conscious agent to decide
about implementation of a project. The agent is also risk-neutral and his
liability is limited. If the project is executed then all parties get to know
whether or not implementation was the right decision. If the project has
been rejected, however, nobody gains information with respect to the qual-
ity of the agent’s evaluation, unless the principal double-checks the rejected
projects at the end of the game. Double-checking is costly to the principal
and has no further consequence than to generate the information whether or
not the agent’s decision to reject was right. Noteworthy, even if the principal
1Compare Prendergast (1999) for an overview.
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finds that the agent wrongly rejected a project he cannot undue the agent’s
decision.2 The probability of costly double-checking rejected projects is pre-
cisely the decision variable at the principal’s hand which is contractually
arranged. The way this contract-contingent variable influences the choice of
e↵ort is market-driven as the agent anticipates the additional information
that the market receives through double-checking. O↵ering a non-negative
bonus for successfully implemented projects, represents the explicit incen-
tive. Assuming investigating the projects by the agent is optimal, we find in
presence of both incentives that only one is used, namely the incentive which
grants the higher benefit-to-cost ratio. The higher the prior probability of
an implemented project to be successful the more likely is the optimal use of
the hybrid incentive instead of triggering the explicit incentive. The intuition
behind this result is found firstly in a decrease of expected double-checking
cost as only charged for rejected projects. Secondly, expected cost of a bonus
does increase as these have to be paid whenever an implemented project
performs well.
One defining assumption underlying the chain of arguments with respect
to the hybrid incentive is credibility of the principal. If she announces a
double-checking rate, then this a↵ects the agent’s e↵ort decision if and only
if the agent takes her announcement to be trustworthy. This issue is further
discussed in section 3.4.
Our model is embedded in the branch of the career concern literature which
treats the information of an acting agent to be endogenous3, which originates
in Milbourn et al. (2001). They model an agent who might undertake some
costly e↵ort to receive a more precise signal. They find an over investment4
in precision as long as the agent exhibits career concerns. The reason is
2It could be argued that the market environment has changed and thus the time to
implement has already passed once the principal double-checks.
3Usually precision is taken exogenously and e↵ort adds on the output on average,
compare Holmstro¨m (1982/99).
4The costs are borne by the firm in their model, instead of being carried by the agent.
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found in a combination of two crucial assumptions. Firstly, the probability
of being smart is assumed to equal the chance of a good project. Secondly,
only implemented projects allow for inference with respect to type. Rejecting
a project prevents any updating informational-wise as no new information
is generated. Put in other words, the agent does not face any risk to prove
himself, which can go either way. For this reason the option to reject is called
a safe haven. An increased precision prevents from executing bad projects
and consequently influences the inference process by the market in the agent’s
favor.
Suurmond et al. (2004) investigate the adverse selection issue involved once
the agent is aware of his type. They find that the agent knowing his type
might be welfare enhancing as the smart agent puts in extra e↵ort to dis-
tinguish himself. The dumb agent however, undertakes ine cient actions to
mimic the smart type. Which force is superior, depends on the parameters.
We focus on the moral hazard issue by assuming no party has knowledge of
the agent’s type, not even the agent himself. Swank and Visser (2008) analyze
the consequences of reputational concerns within a sequential setting in which
two agents evaluate a project after another. Only if both agents approve, the
project is executed. Within this public project framework, su ciently strong
reputational concerns lead the first agent to free-ride by delegating the evalu-
ation decision to the second agent who then has strong incentives to carefully
evaluate the project. More closely related to our model is Bar-Isaac (2012)
who uses a project choice model to examine the e↵ect of transparency on the
agent incentives to exert e↵ort. An exogenously given risk premium by the
market favors either the risky or the conservative project choice. While the
latter one does not make use of information, the risky project heavily hinges
on the agent’s ability to properly process information. Bar-Isaac (2012) finds
that transparency boosts the incentive to exert e↵ort as long as the market
favors the risky project. The reason is that both the benefit of e↵ort and
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the risk premium point into the same direction. If these two are not aligned,
then transparency decreases the incentives to exert e↵ort.
A monitoring instrument at the principal’s hand, like double-checking, which
involves an ex ante commitment to evaluate or investigate ex post, has been
analyzed already in Khalil and Lawarre´e (2001).5 They model an adverse
selection model and introduce multiple variables to be potentially monitored
in order to screen the agent’s type. They find that it is beneficial to the
principal to choose ex post which variables are monitored since dumb agents
are not sure which variable to mimic best. Chen et al. (2013) analyze the
issue of commitment to monitor within an environmental application between
a regulator and a polluting firm. They find that the regulator’s commitment
to monitor the firm is as e cient as a no-commitment scheme. While the
commitment issue is also present in our model, the key di↵erence is the
informational asymmetry with respect to the agent’s type. We assume that
neither the agent himself nor any other party knows his type, compared to
both Khalill and Lawarre´e (2001) and Chen et al. (2013) who investigate this
issue using an adverse selection model. To the best of the author’s knowledge,
our model is the first which combines career concerns with double-checking
in a moral hazard environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces
the basic model including the timing of the game. Section 3.3 analyzes the
di↵erent incentive schemes. Section 3.4 presents a discussion and section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 The Basic Model
A principal delegates the evaluation of a project to an agent. Both are risk
neutral. The project outcome ⌘ depends on the state of the world µ. Let µ 2
5Compare also Baron and Besanko (1984).
54
{G,B} be the two states which can be good or bad. Denote the probability of
a good state with Pr (µ = G) =  . The agent decides about implementation
or rejection of the project. The project outcome is ⌘ = h > 0 if the state
is good, i.e. µ = G and negative if executed in a bad state ⌘ =  h < 06.
The agent can undertake some costly e↵ort to receive a signal s 2 {g, b} with
Pr (s = g) =   about the underlying state of the world. In order to receive a
relevant signal the agent requires both to be informed and to be smart. The
probability of being informed is ⇡ (e) 2 [0, 1] with @⇡(e)@e > 0 and @
2⇡(e)
(@e)2
< 0.
The more e↵ort e is exerted, the more likely is the agent informed, even
though the likelihood increments of being informed are decreasing in e. The
cost of e↵ort c (e) 2 [0,1) with @c(e)@e > 0 and @
2c(e)
(@e)2
> 0 bears the agent
entirely. The agent is either smart (sm) or dumb (du) with Pr (sm) = ↵ 2
[0, 1] being the probability of being smart. Neither party is aware of the
agent’s type. For a dumb agent the signal is pure noise independent of the
level of e↵ort. For a smart agent the signal is true if he is also informed,
and pure noise otherwise. This information process has been introduced by
Suurmond et al. (2004) and is summarized by the probability of a state
conditionally on a signal: Pr (G|g) 7 = ↵⇡ (e)+(1  ↵⇡ (e))  . Given a signal
indicating a good state G, the precision is perfect for a smart and informed
agent. Is he however, either dumb or uninformed, the signal carries only noise
and the probability of G equals its prior probability, i.e.  . The probability of
the complementary event is Pr (B|g) = (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ). The two other
possible conditional probabilities are derived analogously:
Pr (B|b) = ↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ) and Pr (G|b) = (1  ↵⇡ (e))  .
The risk neutral agent has no endowment8 and exhibits career concerns.
6Symmetry is assumed for simplicity but not necessary, as long as good is positive and
bad is negative and h is large enough, such that it is always optimal to o↵er a contract to
the agent.
7Expression is an abbreviation of Pr (µ = G|s = g). In the sequel, expressions involving
probabilities are abbreviated in this manner.
8This assumption rules out contingent punishment payments o↵ered by the principal.
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The latter are modeled via the posterior beliefs the market has about the
agent’s type. The degree of these concerns to the agent is represented by a
multiplying scalar     0.
The principal is ultimately interested in the expected project outcome. She
has two instruments to induce the agent to exert e↵ort. First, she can pay
a non-negative bonus w if the project is implemented and turns out good.
Second, the principal might investigate some rejected projects with proba-
bility  , double-checking the agent’s decision. This activity costs C > 0
and purely generates the information about the correctness of the rejection
decision which then becomes available to the principal, the agent, and the
market. We assume that the project is not to be executed once the principal
has discovered a project wrongly rejected.9 In that sense, double-checking is
ex post ine cient.10 Ex ante though, it induces incentives to exert e↵ort for
the agent who desires to be perceived as smart. A smart agent is more likely
to correctly reject a project. Even though double-checking does not lead to
undo a wrong implementation decision, it does however produce the informa-
tion whether or not the decision of the agent was right. The utility functions
of the agent and the principal are given by UP ( , w) = E[⌘   w]   C and
UA (e) = E[w+ ↵]  c (e). Both utility functions consist of three additively
separable components. The principal cares for the expected project outcome
⌘, pays the expected bonus and the cost of the double-checking activity. For
the agent, the expected bonus lifts his utility. He bears the cost of e↵ort and
exhibits career concerns.
9This assumption ensures the focus of our analysis is on the career concerns e↵ects of
double-checking.
10We assume that the principal prefers to stick to   ex post. This could be due to
reputational concerns if she is interacting with many agents. However, we do not model
these reputational concerns explicitly. This issue is further discussed in section 3.4.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5
-
nature principal agent agent principal payments
chooses o↵ers accepts decides on double-checks are made
type and contract with contract e↵ort and with   and posteriors
state   and w project if rejected are updated
In stage 0, nature draws the type of the agent and the state of the world. Both
remain unknown to all parties. In stage 1, the principal decides about the
level of   and w. Upon accepting the contract in stage 2, the agent optimally
chooses e↵ort and receives a signal about the state in stage 3. The signal is
potentially used by the agent with respect to his implementation decision. If
rejected, the decision is potentially checked in stage 4. If implemented, the
project is realized. Posterior beliefs are updated, and payments are made
accordingly, in stage 5.
3.3 Main Results
We employ the equilibrium concept of a Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
which consists of three parts. For the agent it states an e↵ort level and a
decision rule potentially based on the received signal. Secondly, it determines
for the principal both, w and  . The third part requires the market to update
its beliefs via Bayesian Updating. Moreover, any choice must be optimal,
given the other choices. We solve the game using backward induction. The
proposed strategy concerning the implementation is to follow his signal. That
is to say, a reception of s = g is followed by choosing to implement and a
rejection in case of s = b. Denote b↵Iright the belief of the market that the agent
is smart once a correct implementation decision is revealed. Denote b↵Iwrong
57
the belief of the market that the agent is smart after a wrong implementation
decision by the agent. Analogously, denote b↵Rright the belief after a correctly
decided rejection and b↵Rwrong otherwise. The following relations hold:
b↵Iright = ⇡ (be) + (1  ⇡ (be))  ↵⇡ (be) + (1  ↵⇡ (be))  ↵   ↵   (1   ) (1  ⇡ (be))(1   ) (1  ↵⇡ (be))↵ = b↵Iwrong
(3.1)
and
b↵Rright = ⇡ (be) + (1  ⇡ (be)) (1   )↵⇡ (be) + (1  ↵⇡ (be)) (1   )↵   ↵   (1  ⇡ (be))  (1  ↵⇡ (be))  ↵ = b↵Rwrong.
(3.2)
The notation be indicates the market’s belief of the e↵ort choice. Making
right decisions is more likely made by smart agents, which is reflected inb↵right   ↵. Vice versa, making wrong decisions hurts the career concerns,
i.e. ↵   b↵wrong. Depending on the distribution of the states the highest
posterior belief is reached by correctly implementing or correctly rejecting
the project. For equally likely states, i.e.   = 12 both posterior beliefs are
equal, i.e. b↵Iright = b↵Rright. If   > 12 , then correctly rejecting is less likely
and hence rather made by a smart agent, thus it holds for this range thatb↵Rright > b↵Iright. The same logic applies for the range   < 12 with correctly
implementing being the best posterior, i.e. b↵Iright > b↵Rright.11
In case the project is rejected and not double-checked, the market’s posterior
beliefs equal the priors since no relevant information is revealed. We sharpen
our focus on equilibria involving a positive optimal e↵ort level, since our
intention of the paper is to analyze the consequences of career concerns with
respect to the optimal use of di↵erent incentives. The agent must su ciently
care about his reputation, since the only harm of implementing a wrong
project is on his reputation. If he does not care about his perception, then
11Consider the boundary case   = 0 (  = 1), then the relation still holds, thusb↵Iright > b↵Rright (b↵Rright > b↵Iright) even though the agent never implements (rejects) given
the strategy to follow his signal.
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he should implement irrespective of the received signal due to the explicit
incentives. Therefore, the following assumption is introduced:
Assumption 1 Assume     (1 ↵⇡(e))2 ( +(1  )↵⇡(e))
(↵⇡(e))2(1 ↵) w
⇤.
The next lemma ensures the optimality of the proposed strategy that the
agent’s implementation decision is characterized by following his signal.
Lemma 1 Given Assumption 1 and a positive e↵ort level, then it is always
optimal for the agent to follow his signal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice, for w⇤ = 0, Assumption 1 is automatically fulfilled. Three cases
are considered. The first two cases investigate the e↵ect of pure explicit or
hybrid incentives, respectively. The third case analyzes the interaction e↵ect
of both kinds of incentives.
3.3.1 Case 1: Explicit incentives
In this case the principal can only choose the optimal w⇤ in order to in-
centivize the agent. The bonus is granted if the agent implements a good
project. For a given w⇤ and sticking to the following signal behavior, the
agent chooses his unobservable e↵ort level optimally in stage 2. The utility
function of the agent is given by:
UA (e) = E[w +  ↵]  c (e) (3.3)
= Pr (g) Pr (G|g)w⇤+ Pr (g)  Pr (G|g) b↵Iright + Pr (B|g) b↵Iwrong 
+  Pr (b)↵  c (e)
The first-order condition o↵sets the marginal benefit of e↵ort with its marginal
costs.
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@UA (e)
@e
=   (1   )↵@⇡ (e)
@e
 
 
 b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong + w⇤   @c (e)@e = 0 (3.4)
We assume that the optimal e↵ort level implied by equation (3.4) is posi-
tive. The higher the e↵ort, the higher the probability of a correct decision.
Correctly implemented projects have two benefits for the agent: the contrac-
tually arranged bonus w⇤ and his increase in reputation b↵Iright. Moreover, a
correct rejection prevents the market from forming unfavorable beliefs about
the agent, i.e. b↵Iwrong. Reputational concerns and the bonus point in the
same direction such that they both enhance the marginal benefit of e↵ort. In
fact, applying the implicit function theorem shows @e@w > 0.
12 In anticipation
of the agent’s behavior the principal’s utility function is given by:
UP (w) = E[⌘   w] (3.5)
= Pr (g) (Pr (G|g)  Pr (B|g))h  Pr (g) Pr (G|g)w
Increasing the bonus leads not only to higher incentives for the agent, but
also to higher costs for the principal. The optimal bonus w⇤ trades o↵ both
e↵ects and is given by:
w⇤Case 1 =
2h  (1   )↵
⇣
@⇡(e)
@e
⌘2
  (1   )↵
⇣
@⇡(e)
@e
⌘2     (  + (1   )↵⇡ (e)) @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
(3.6)
+
  (  + (1   )↵⇡ (e))   b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong  @2⇡(e)(@e)2
  (1   )↵
⇣
@⇡(e)
@e
⌘2     (  + (1   )↵⇡ (e)) @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
 
 +(1  )↵⇡(e)
(1  )↵
@2c(e)
(@e)2
  (1   )↵
⇣
@⇡(e)
@e
⌘2     (  + (1   )↵⇡ (e)) @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
12See the Proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix. It is due to assumptions about
concavity of ⇡ (e) and convexity of c (e).
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The optimal level of the bonus increases in the project outcome spread be-
tween correctly and wrongly implementing projects, 2h. The bonus is lower
the higher the cost of e↵ort. A bonus aims at inducing e↵ort, hence enlarged
cost of e↵ort that has to be compensated by the principal naturally results
in a smaller bonus. Interestingly, the optimal bonus is also lower, the higher
the agent’s career concerns. The intuition behind the negative impact of  
is due to the decreasing benefit of e↵ort captured in the concavity of ⇡ (e).
In the absence of any bonus, the agent has incentives to exert e↵ort in order
to influence the market’s posterior beliefs about his type in his favor. The
bonus incentives are additional to these implicit incentives and less e↵ective
the more present the implicit incentives are.
3.3.2 Case 2: Hybrid incentives
What changes if the principal can only choose the probability of double-
checking   instead of a bonus w? The utility function of the agent changes
accordingly:
UA (e) =  E[↵]  c (e) (3.7)
=  Pr (g)
 
Pr (G|g) b↵Iright + Pr (B|g) b↵Iwrong 
+  Pr (b)
 
 ⇤
 
Pr (G|b) b↵Rwrong + Pr (B|b) b↵Rright + (1   ⇤)↵   c (e)
The career concerns play a larger role due to the potential double-checking ac-
tivity by the principal. The agent interprets this activity as an enhanced op-
portunity to show his abilities. Taking the announced probability of double-
checking  ⇤ as given and trustworthy, the agent anticipates the modified con-
sequences of rejecting a project, compared to case 1. Any rejected project is
checked with probability  ⇤ and then reveals perfectly the correctness of the
agent’s decision. The following first-order condition adjusts for the changed
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environment and considers the e↵ect of double-checking:
@UA (e)
@e
=   (1   )↵@⇡ (e)
@e
 
  b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong +  ⇤  b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  
(3.8)
  @c (e)
@e
The probability of double-checking  ⇤ boosts the incentives to exert e↵ort,
i.e. @e@ ⇤ > 0.
13 In particular, if any rejected project is about to be checked
then the reputational concerns are twice as pronounced as in the absence
of any check for equally likely states. This is seen by comparing the terms
with  ⇤ = 0 and  ⇤ = 1 for   = 12 . Yet again, double-checking binds the
principal’s resources and comes at a cost C per executed check. The utility
of the principal changes to:
UP ( ) = E[⌘]   C (3.9)
= Pr (g) (Pr (G|g)  Pr (B|g))h   C
The principal optimally chooses   at the beginning of the game. It is assumed
that this announcement is credible. The principal maximizes his utility by
choosing:
 ⇤Case 2 =
2h 
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  ⇣  (1   )↵@⇡(e)@e ⌘2   C @2c(e)(@e)2
    (1   )  b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong ↵@2⇡(e)(@e)2 C (3.10)
 
 b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong  b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong 
As for the optimal level of the bonus, the spread in project outcome 2h has
positive e↵ects on the optimal probability to double-check. Moreover, also
the cost of e↵ort points in the same direction, namely a negative e↵ect. For
13See the appendix.
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the consequence of the degree of exhibited career concerns of the agent, how-
ever, the story is quite di↵erent. The larger  , the higher the optimal level  ⇤.
Double-checking rejected projects generates the information whether or not
the agent’s decision was right. The higher the probability of double-checking,
the higher the probability for the market to have access to more information
which boosts the implicit incentives to exert e↵ort. Consequently, an in-
creased level of double-checking is made more e cient by an increased level
of  . Nevertheless, the decreasing benefits of e↵ort are also present with the
same harmful manner as for the optimal bonus, i.e. the more concave ⇡ (e),
the higher the cost of double-checking.
3.3.3 Case 3: Combination of both incentives
The third case considers a combination of the first two cases. The principal
can choose both, a bonus and a double-checking rate. The proposed strategy
of the agent remains unchanged. Due to the property of additively separation
the agent’s utility adds up straightforwardly to:
UA (e) = E[w +  ↵]  c (e) (3.11)
= Pr (g) Pr (G|g)w⇤ +  Pr (g)  Pr (G|g) b↵Iright + Pr (B|g) b↵Iwrong 
+  Pr (b)
 
 ⇤
 
Pr (G|b) b↵Rwrong + Pr (B|b) b↵Rright + (1   ⇤)↵   c (e)
The agent maximizes his utility over e such that the following first derivative
results:
@UA (e)
@e
=   (1   )↵@⇡ (e)
@e
 
  b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong +  ⇤  b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  
(3.12)
+   (1   )↵@⇡ (e)
@e
w⇤   @c (e)
@e
The benefits of e↵ort in bonus and double-checking are linear such that the
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combined benefit equals the sum. The principal chooses w and   such that
her utility function is maximized:
UP ( , w) = E[⌘   w]   C (3.13)
= Pr (g) (Pr (G|g)  Pr (B|g))h  Pr (g) Pr (G|g)w    C
The following proposition describes the equilibrium solving this optimization
problem.
Proposition 1 Given Assumption 1, a case distinction with respect to   is
made. Suppose   2 [ (1 ↵⇡(e))2 ( +(1  )↵⇡(e))
(↵⇡(e))2(1 ↵) w
⇤
Case 1;
C
 ( +(1  )↵⇡)
⇣b↵Rright b↵Rwrong⌘ ), then e⇤
is implied by setting equation (3.12) to zero. The agent follows his signal.
The principal choices are w⇤=w⇤Case 1 and  ⇤ = 0.
Suppose   2 [ C
 ( +(1  )↵⇡)
⇣b↵Rright b↵Rwrong⌘ ;1), then the agent chooses e⇤ such that
equation (3.12) set to zero is fulfilled. The agent follows his signal. The
principal chooses w⇤=0 and  ⇤ =  ⇤Case 2. In both instances the market updates
its beliefs via Bayesian updating using the corresponding optimal e↵ort level.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The degree of career consciousness of the agent characterizes the equilibrium
of this model. It turns out that only one incentive instrument is used. In-
tuitively, both incentives target at inducing the agent to exert e↵ort. Since
there is no spill-over e↵ect present, i.e. using one incentive does not re-
sult in a more e cient use of the other incentive, choosing the incentive
which has a higher benefit-to-cost of e↵ort ratio is optimal. The inequality
 
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  ? C ( +(1  )↵⇡) drives the result. Optimality requires a
superior ratio which hinges on the fact how e↵ectively w or   induce the
agent to exert unobservable e↵ort. In particular, the principal prefers using
explicit incentives if either an execution of a double-check is too costly or if
the e↵ect of making a right implementation decision is not su ciently strong
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for the agent. The latter happens if the degree of career concerns is not
strongly valued or in case of a narrow spread between posterior beliefs. Most
interestingly, double-checking is favored by an increase in the prior probabil-
ity of good states  . The reasoning is found in the increased probability of
correctly implemented projects which results in both lower expected costs of
 , since it only takes place for rejected projects with a certain probability,
and higher expected cost of w. By the same line of argument, the principal
rather makes use of the implicit incentive if the prior probability of the agent
being smart is higher.
For a su ciently low value of  , i.e. in case of failing Assumption 1, the agent
has no incentive to exert e↵ort and follow his signal but to implement in any
case. Since exerting e↵ort supports the implementation decision, there is no
benefit of e↵ort but only costs in case of this implementation decision rule.
This is optimal for the agent, as the only drawback of implementing wrong
projects is being perceived as not so smart.
3.4 Discussion
The agent chooses her e↵ort level optimally in anticipation of a specific bonus
and a certain probability of rejected projects to be checked. For this mecha-
nism to work, the principal’s credibility to act in accordance with her o↵ered
contract to the agent is of crucial importance. Per se the principal has no
interest in paying the bonus or costly checking projects after the agent has
already done his job. Even though the instrument is ine cient ex post from
the principal’s point of view, we showed that she does not set both to zero
due to the ex ante incentives for the agent to induce e↵ort. If the agent
however, doubts the principal’s credibility to act accordingly, these ex ante
incentives vanish since for him double-ckecking is e cient ex post. In case of
explicit incentives, the assumption is met by a su ciently high penalty cost
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for deviating. If the principal hesitates to pay, the agent credibly threatens to
file a lawsuit. For the announcement of the double-ckecking rate   the issue
is more complicated, since the agent’s interest in executing the check ex post
is less clear compared to the case of the bonus. For this reason, we consider
that the principal exhibits reputational concerns which ensures that her ex
ante announcement appears to be credible to her employees. The threat of
losing her reputation once, and hence losing this kind of incentive makes her
act in accordance with her announcement.
So far a bonus was paid for successfully implemented projects only. What
if the bonus is made contingent on a correct decision by the agent? That
is to say, the agent claims a bonus for correctly rejecting in addition to
correctly implementing. This modification leads to increased incentives to
exert e↵ort for the agent. As not only the information about the correctness
of the evaluation decision is generated but also rewarded if correct. For the
same reason this bonus leads to increased cost of executed double-checks.
Qualitatively speaking, the results of Proposition 1 still hold.
In Milbourn et al. (2001) the assumption of a safe haven was crucial for
career concerns to induce incentives. Per se, rejecting a project does not
reveal the correctness of the implementation decision and o↵ers the agent a
safe haven such that he does not face the risk of proving himself. In our model
the safe haven plays also an important role but for quite di↵erent reasons.
Milbourn et al. (2001) model the type space as the conditional probability
of a project to be successful. When the market has access to the entire range
of events and is able to infer for any instance the agent’s type then the agent
can not shift the probabilities about his type in his favor as exerting e↵ort
only increases the precision of a signal but leaves the prior probability of good
projects unchanged. Consequently, the presence of reputational concerns has
no influence on the agents optimal e↵ort choice, in absence of a safe haven.
In our model instead, the safe haven is important for the hybrid incentive
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to work. Double-checking is obsolete when each project, irrespective of the
evaluation decision, generates the information whether or not the agent did
the right choice. The agents desire to be perceived favorably with respect to
her type is nevertheless present even if there is no safe haven, which can be
seen by a positive optimal e↵ort for w = 0 and   = 1.
3.5 Conclusion
Within a project choice model we introduce a hybrid incentive which is at
the same time contract-contingent and market-driven. This hybrid incentive
works best to induce a career-conscious agent to exert e↵ort when the likeli-
hood of having a project successfully implemented is quite high even without
further investigation by the agent. This allows for a more nuanced view on
optimal labor contracts for experts. Future research should investigate the
optimal use of hybrid incentives in the long-run akin Gibbons and Murphy
analysis about the interplay between explicit and implicit incentives. Stress-
ing the driving inequality causing the distinction which instrument is used,
an established reputation decreases both marginal benefit-to-cost of e↵ort
ratios such that a prediction ought to be an object of future research.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Proof of lemma 1
The agent follows his signal if and only if two inequalities hold. For s = g,
the utility of implementation must be larger or equal to the utility of rejec-
tion, i.e. Pr (G|g)w⇤+  ↵  c (e⇤)    ⇤ (Pr (G|g) b↵Rwrong +Pr (B|g) b↵Rright) +
(1   ⇤) ↵   c (e⇤). Notice, the expectation of the agent’s type equals the
prior probability ↵ in equilibrium. As the agent himself is also not aware
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of his type, he can not cheat on this, in equilibrium. Simplifying the in-
equality to Pr (G|g)w⇤    ⇤   Pr (G|g) b↵Rwrong + Pr (B|g) b↵Rright   ↵  shows
that it is always fulfilled. The left-hand side (LHS) is non-negative and the
right-hand side (RHS) is negative. The second inequality aims at s = b.
Then the utility of rejecting must be larger or equal to the utility of imple-
menting, i.e.   ⇤
 
Pr (G|b) b↵Rwrong + Pr (B|b) b↵Rright  + (1   ⇤) ↵   c (e⇤) >
Pr (G|b)w⇤ +    Pr (B|b) b↵Iwrong + Pr (G|b) b↵Iright   c (e⇤) which simplifies to
 (↵   Pr (B|b) b↵Iwrong   Pr (G|b) b↵Iright) > Pr (G|b)w⇤. The LHS is non-
negative as
 
↵  Pr (B|b) b↵Iwrong   Pr (G|b) b↵Iright  = ↵⇡(be) +(1  )↵⇡(be) (1 ↵)↵⇡(be)(1 ⇡(be)↵) .
Since the RHS is non-negative as well, however, a su ciently large   must
be assumed, since a project might go well even in presence of a conflicting
signal, the agent has an incentive to deviate from the strategy and imple-
ment anyways as long as he does not care su ciently enough for his reputa-
tion. If     Pr(G|b)
(↵ Pr(B|b)b↵Iwrong Pr(G|b)b↵Iright)w⇤ then the second inequality holds
which is exactly as Assumption 1 requires. Consequently, Assumption 1
i.e.     (1 ↵⇡(e))2 ( +(1  )↵⇡(e))
(↵⇡(e))2(1 ↵) w
⇤, ensures optimality of the following-signal
strategy. q.e.d.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1
Inserting the probabilities into (3.3) gives
UA (e) =   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  )w⇤
+  ((↵⇡ (e)+(1  ↵⇡ (e))  )b↵Iright+(1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ) b↵Iwrong)+  (1   )↵
 c (e). Taking the first derivative with respect to e↵ort results in @UA(e)@e =
 ↵@⇡(e)@e (1   )w⇤+   (1   )↵@⇡(e)@e (b↵Iright  b↵Iwrong)  @c(e)@e which is equiva-
lent to (3.4). Using implicit function theorem, i.e. @e@w⇤ =  
@UA(e)
@e
@w⇤
@UA(e)
@e
@e
, to analyze
the e↵ect of in increase in w⇤ on e↵ort:
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@e
@w⇤ =  
 (1  )↵ @⇡(e)@e
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( (b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2 > 0. Expression is positive due
to the assumptions @⇡(e)@e > 0;
@2⇡(e)
(@e)2
< 0 and @
2c(e)
(@e)2
> 0. The principal antici-
pates the positive e↵ect of a bonus on e↵ort. She maximizes her utility over w.
(3.5) leads to UP (w) =   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))     (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ))h 
  (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  )w after inserting the probabilities. Taking the first
derivative with respect to w results in @U
P (w)
@w =   (1   )↵@⇡(e)@w (2h  w)  
  (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  ). Using chain rule, i.e. @⇡(e)@w = @⇡(e)@e @e@w and set-
ting it to zero, leads to:   ( (1  )↵
@⇡(e)
@e )
2
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( (b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2 (2h  w
⇤)  
  (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  ) = 0 which is solved by 3.6.
Case 2
Inserting the probabilities into (3.7) gives
UA (e) =  ( ((↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  ) b↵Iright+(1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ) b↵Iwrong)+
(1   ) ( ⇤(((1  ↵⇡ (e))  ) b↵Rwrong + (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   )) b↵Rright) +
(1   ⇤)↵))  c (e). The first derivative with respect to e results in @UA(e)@e =
 (  (1   )↵@⇡(e)@e (b↵Iright  b↵Iwrong)+(1   )  ⇤ ↵@⇡(e)@e (b↵Rright  b↵Rwrong))  @c(e)@e
which is equivalent to (3.8). Using implicit function theorem to analyze the
e↵ect of in increase in  ⇤ on the e↵ort level:
@e
@ ⇤ =  
@UA(e)
@e
@ ⇤
@UA(e)
@e
@e
=     (1  )↵(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong) @⇡(e)@e
  (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))  @2c(e)(@e)2 > 0
The utility of the principal, compare equation (3.9), is given by:
UP ( ) =   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))     (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ))h    C. Taking
the first derivative gives: @U
P ( )
@  = 2h  (1   )↵@⇡(e)@    C. Using chain rule,
so @⇡(e)@  =
@⇡(e)
@e
@e
@  and setting it to zero, leads to:
  2h (b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)( (1  )↵ @⇡(e)@e )2
  (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))  @2c(e)(@e)2   C = 0 which is solved
by expression (3.10).
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Case 3
Considering equation (3.11), the utility of the agent changes to
UA (e) =   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  )w⇤+  ((↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  ) b↵Iright+
(1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ) b↵Iwrong)
+  (1   ) ( ⇤((1  ↵⇡ (e))  b↵Rwrong+(↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   )) b↵Rright)+
(1   ⇤)↵)   c (e). Taking the first derivative with respect to e↵ort gives
@UA(e)
@e =  ↵
@⇡(e)
@e (1   )w⇤ +    (1   )↵@⇡(e)@e (b↵Iright   b↵Iwrong)
+  (1   )  ⇤ ↵@⇡(e)@e (b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong)  @c(e)@e which is equivalent to equation
3.12. Applying the implicit function theorem allows for:
@e
@w =  
@UA(e)
@e
@w
@UA(e)
@e
@e
=    (1  )↵
@⇡(e)
@e
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( ((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2
@e
@  =  
@UA(e)
@e
@ 
@UA(e)
@e
@e
=     (1  )↵(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong) @⇡(e)@e
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( ((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2
Inserting probabilities into 3.13 leads to principal’s utility:
UP ( , w) =   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))     (1  ↵⇡ (e)) (1   ))h
   (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  )w  C. Recognizing the character of the utility
of the principal reduces the first derivatives with respect to w and  , respec-
tively, as follows: @U
P ( ,w)
@w =
@UP (w)
@w and
@UP ( ,w)
@  =
@UP ( )
@     (1   )↵@⇡(e)@  w.
Applying chain rule, the latter translates to
@UP ( ,w)
@  =  
(2h w) (b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)( (1  )↵ @⇡(e)@e )2
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( ((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2   C.
Optimization Problem
The principal optimizes her utility taking the optimizing behavior of the
agent into account. She considers the non-negativity constraints of   and
w. Any solution is required to fulfill the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(KTCs): The bonus w must fulfill: @U
P ( ,w)
@w  0 ; w   0 ; w @U
P ( ,w)
@w = 0
and the double-checking rate  : @U
P ( ,w)
@   0 ;     0 ;   @U
P ( ,w)
@  = 0.
Check first instance Suppose w > 0, then @U
P ( ,w)
@w = 0
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,   (2h w)( (1  )↵
@⇡(e)
@e )
2
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( ((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2
   (↵⇡ + (1  ↵⇡)  ) = 0
with solution:
w1 =
2h  1✓
(1  )↵@⇡(e)
@e
◆2
 
✓
@2c(e)
(@e)2
   ↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
⇣⇣b↵Iright b↵Iwrong⌘+ ⇤⇣b↵Rright b↵Rwrong⌘⌘(1  )◆(↵⇡(e)+ (1 ↵⇡(e)))
  1✓
@⇡(e)
@e
◆2
@2⇡(e)
(@e)2
↵(1  ) (↵⇡(e)+ (1 ↵⇡(e)))+1
.
Inserted in @U
P ( ,w)
@  results in
@UP ( ,w1)
@  =  
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong    (↵⇡ (e) + (1  ↵⇡ (e))  )   C. If negative,
then KTCs require   = 0. If positive, then KTCs are violated.
Check second instance Suppose   > 0, then @U
P ( ,w)
@  = 0
,   (2h w) (b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)( (1  )↵ @⇡(e)@e )2
 (1  )↵ @2⇡(e)
(@e)2
( ((b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ ⇤(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong))+w⇤)  @2c(e)(@e)2   C = 0
with solution
 1 =  
0BBB@(b↵Iright b↵Iwrong)+ 1 
0BBB@w  1 ↵@2⇡(e)
(@e)2
@2c(e)
(@e)2
+
( @⇡(e)@e )
2
C ↵
2  2(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)(1  )2( 2h+w)
1  
1CCCA
1CCCA
(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)
Inserting in @U
P ( ,w)
@w gives
@UP ( ,w)
@w =
C   (b↵Rright b↵Rwrong)(↵⇡(e)+ (1 ↵⇡(e)))
 (b↵Rright b↵Rwrong) . If
negative, then KTCs require w = 0. If positive, then KTCs are violated.
Summary Line of argument in both instances are based on the same in-
equality:
a.) If  
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  < C ( +(1  )↵⇡) , then w⇤ = w⇤case 1 and  ⇤ = 0
b.) If  
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  > C ( +(1  )↵⇡) , then w⇤ = 0 and  ⇤ =  ⇤Case 2.
c.) If  
 b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  = C ( +(1  )↵⇡) , then @UP@  =    b↵Rright   b↵Rwrong  @UP@w ,
implying that both are substitutes.
Equilibrium
The equilbrium of this game is fully described by:
For   2 [ (1 ↵⇡(e))2 ( +(1  )↵⇡(e))
(↵⇡(e))2(1 ↵) w
⇤; C
(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong) ( +(1  )↵⇡)), then e⇤ is the
solution to 3.4 and w⇤ = w⇤case 1 and  
⇤ = 0 and all posteriors use the
corresponding optimal e↵ort level.
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For   2 [ C
(b↵Rright b↵Rwrong) ( +(1  )↵⇡) ;1), then e⇤ is the solution to equation 3.8
set to zero. The principal chooses w⇤ = 0 and  ⇤ =  ⇤Case 2 and all posteriors
use the corresponding optimal e↵ort level. q.e.d.
Depending on the parameters, the first distinction might not be existent.
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